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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND FORENSIC 
SCIENCE:  THE NEED TO REGULATE CRIME 
LABS* 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI** 
DNA testing has exonerated over 200 convicts, some of whom were 
on death row.  Studies show that a substantial number of these 
miscarriages of justice involved scientific fraud or junk science.  
This Article documents the failures of crime labs and some forensic 
techniques, such as microscopic hair comparison and bullet lead 
analysis.  Some cases involved incompetence and sloppy 
procedures, while others entailed deceit, but the extent of the 
derelictions—the number of episodes and the duration of some of 
the abuses, covering decades in several instances—demonstrates 
that the problems are systemic. 
Paradoxically, the most scientifically sound procedure—DNA 
analysis—is the most extensively regulated, while many forensic 
techniques with questionable scientific pedigrees go completely 
unregulated.  The regulation of DNA profiling, which has 
developed gradually over the last twenty years, can serve as a model 
for other laboratory units.  The accreditation of crime laboratories, 
the certification of examiners, and the standardization and 
promulgation of written protocols for each technique would go a 
long way in professionalizing forensic science.  In addition, quality 
assurance programs, including proficiency testing and external 
audits, should be mandated.  Finally, forensic science commissions 
should be established in every jurisdiction to implement these and 
other reforms. 
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“At present, forensic science is virtually unregulated—with the 
paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher 
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic 
labs must meet to put a defendant on death row.” 
—Eric S. Lander, molecular biologist, 19891 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2004, the Chief of the Houston Police Department 
called for a moratorium on executions of convicts from Harris County 
until after his crime laboratory had completed a review of numerous 
old case files.2  This breathtaking development in the county where 
the most death penalty cases originate3 is not an isolated incident of 
laboratory failure.  Earlier, the Governor of Illinois had imposed a 
moratorium on executions in that state due in part to faulty scientific 
evidence.4 
The extent of forensic science’s role in convicting the innocent is 
difficult to gauge, although it is clearly substantial.  In Actual 
Innocence, Barry Scheck and his colleagues examined sixty-two of the 
first sixty-seven DNA exonerations secured in North America 
through Cardozo Law School’s Innocence Project, concluding that a 
third of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science.”5  A 
subsequent review identified forensic science testing errors in 63% of 
the wrongful convictions and false or misleading testimony by 
                                                          
 1. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989). 
 2. See Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs:  Flawed Work, 
Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, § 1, at 1 (“Gov. Rick 
Perry has rejected a plea from Houston’s police chief to halt executions of inmates 
convicted in Harris County until the scope of problems at the police crime lab can be 
determined.”).  According to state senator Rodney Ellis, “the validity of almost any case 
that has relied upon evidence produced by the lab is questionable.”  Rodney Ellis, 
Editorial, Want Tough on Crime?  Start by Fixing HPD Lab, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 5, 
2004, at D1. 
 3. See Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Crime Testing in 
Houston Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19 (“Since the death penalty was reinstated 
in 1976, Texas has executed 323 people, 73 for crimes in Harris County.”). 
 4. See generally REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (State of Ill. 2002), available at http://www.state.il.us/defender/ccpr.html 
(recommending independent crime labs).  Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium 
on January 31, 2000 and appointed the Commission on March 9, 2000.  Id. at i. 
 5. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:  FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000).  There have been 208 
DNA exonerations.  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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forensic experts in 27%.6  A 2004 Chicago Tribune series on crime 
laboratories reported that an examination of “the 200 DNA and 
Death Row exoneration cases since 1986 . . . found that more than a 
quarter involved faulty crime lab work or testimony.”7  A 2005 study 
identified twenty-four prosecutions in which forensic scientists 
committed perjury.8 
The most recent study of 200 DNA exonerations found that 
forensic evidence (present in 57% of the cases) was the second 
leading type of evidence (after eyewitness identifications at 79%) 
used in wrongful conviction cases.9  Pre-DNA serology of blood and 
semen evidence was the most commonly used forensic technique (79 
cases).10  Next came “hair evidence (43 cases), soil comparison (5 
cases), DNA tests (3 cases), bite mark evidence (3 cases), fingerprint 
evidence (2 cases), dog scent identification (2 cases), spectrographic 
voice evidence (1 case), shoe prints (1 case), and fiber comparison (1 
case).”11  This does not mean, however, that the forensic evidence was 
improperly used.  For example, serological testing at the time of many 
of these convictions was simply not as discriminating as DNA 
profiling.12  Yet, some evidence was clearly misused.13 
In addition to Houston,14 lab problems have surfaced in 
Baltimore,15 Chicago,16 Cleveland,17 Los Angeles,18 Fort Worth,19 
                                                          
 6. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, Review, The Coming Paradigm Shift in 
Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 fig.1 (2005) (reviewing eighty-six 
DNA exoneration cases). 
 7. Possley et al., supra note 2. 
 8. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States:  1989 Through 2003, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543 (2005).  This study identified 340 exonerations, 196 
of which did not involve DNA evidence.  Id. at 524. 
 9. Garrett, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24 tbl.2). 
 10. Id. (manuscript at 31). 
 11. Id. 
 12. This type of evidence involved ABO typing and enzyme/protein analysis.  See 1 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17.09[c], at 
977 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing red cell enzymes and serum proteins). 
 13. The DNA cases 
involved experts who offered misleading testimony and mischaracterized their 
own laboratory reports.  Two cases involved improper analysis and testimony that 
resulted in false inclusions.  In one case, that of Gilbert Alejandro, the criminalist 
claimed a DNA match even though neither he nor anyone else had conducted the 
DNA testing. 
Garrett, supra note 5 (manuscript at 34).  The expert was Fred Zain.  For a discussion of 
Zain, see infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 165–207 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Possley et al., supra note 2 (“In Baltimore County, for instance, officials 
pledged a review of analyst Concepcion Bacasnot’s cases after DNA Tests in 2003 
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Montana,20 Oklahoma City,21 San Antonio,22 Seattle,23 Virginia,24 and 
West Virginia,25 as well as other locations.26 
                                                                                                                                      
exonerated an inmate whom her work helped convict of rape.  In another case, she said 
she did not understand the science involved in her work.”). 
 16. See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, Editorial, Junk Science, Junk Evidence, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A31 (“In Chicago, a police lab analyst, Pamela Fish, left out 
exculpatory serological results in testimony at a 1992 rape trial, contributing to a wrongful 
conviction.  In 1999, the defendant was exonerated by DNA tests.  Questions have now 
been raised about Ms. Fish’s conduct in a 1986 murder case.”); infra notes 150–64 and 
accompanying text. 
 17. See Connie Schultz, City to Pay $1.6 Million for Man’s Prison Time, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, June 8, 2004, at A1 (reporting that City of Cleveland agreed to pay Michael 
Green $1.6 million for the thirteen years he spent in prison for a rape he did not commit, 
and an independent master was appointed to review a lab examiner’s prior cases). 
 18. See Anna Gorman, LAPD Narcotics Analyst Erred:  Botched Evidence Raises 
Question on Credibility.  Public Defender’s Office Demands an Accounting, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2004, at B1 (noting that Jeff Lowe, who analyzed drugs for the LAPD since May 
2003, failed to weigh drugs separately from the containers in which they were seized “in 
forty-seven cases, leading to a review of 972 that he handled”). 
 19. See Deanna Boyd, Crime Lab Subject of Criminal Inquiry, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, April 13, 2003, at 1 (“[A DNA] proficiency test revealed that a senior 
forensic scientist did not follow proper procedures and protocol.  The review will involve 
almost 100 cases.”). 
 20. See Adam Liptak, DNA Will Let a Montana Man Put Prison Behind Him, but 
Questions Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A22; infra notes 125–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 21. See Lois Romano, Police Chemist’s Missteps Cause Okla. Scandal, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 26, 2001, at A1 (citing what is “arguably the biggest law enforcement scandal in 
Oklahoma history”); infra notes 68–124 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Laurie P. Cohen, ‘Scared of Science’:  Crime Labs’ Work Is Rarely Challenged 
by Defense Lawyers, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1997, at A1 (discussing the case of Sonia Cacy).  
Cacy received a ninety-nine year sentence for murder by arson based on an inaccurate 
chemical test.  See Dateline:  Body of Evidence (NBC television broadcast Apr. 21, 1999) 
(analyzing the Cacy case).  Cacy was paroled after serving only six months.  See John 
MacCormack, Woman is Paroled Despite Big Sentence, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Nov. 24, 1998, at 1A. 
 23. See Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring DNA 
Test Problems, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter 
Teichroeb, Rare Look]; Ruth Teichroeb, Oversight of Crime-Lab Staff Has Often Been 
Lax, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 23, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Teichroeb, 
Oversight of Crime-Lab Staff]; Ruth Teichroeb, Crime Labs Too Beholden to Prosecutors, 
Critics Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 23, 2004, at A13 [hereinafter Teichroeb, 
Crime Labs Too Beholden]. 
 24. See infra notes 208–35 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Lawrence Messina, State Police Lab Review Leaves Agency With Another 
Shiner, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Charleston, W. Va.), Mar. 13, 2002, at 1A (“The trooper 
who discovered one of the more recent scandals at the State Police crime lab was placed 
on leave Tuesday pending an investigation of his own work there.”); infra notes 52–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., Laura Cadiz, Maryland-Based DNA Lab Fires Analyst Over Falsified 
Tests, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2004, at 1A (reporting that, on November 18, 2004, Orchid 
Cellmark—the world’s largest private DNA testing firm—announced that it fired analyst 
Sarah Blair for falsifying test data); Terry Horne, Crime Lab Boss Placed on Leave, 
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Moreover, a series of embarrassing incidents has plagued the FBI 
Laboratory, this country’s premier forensic facility, leading to the 
issuance of Inspector General reports that were critical of the 
explosives unit in 199727 and a DNA unit in 2004.28  Further, an FBI 
metallurgist pleaded guilty for giving false testimony concerning 
comparative analysis of bullet lead in 2003,29 and a scathing internal 
report on the Bureau’s misidentification of fingerprints in the Madrid 
train bombing was issued in 2004.30 
Some of the crime lab failures involved incompetence and sloppy 
procedures, while others entailed fraud, but the extent of the 
derelictions—the number of episodes and the duration of some of the 
abuses, covering decades in several instances31—precludes dismissal 
                                                                                                                                      
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 25, 2004, at 1A (“Mayor Bart Peterson relieved Forensic 
Services Agency Director James E. Hamby of his duties . . . amid growing concern that the 
crime lab chief had covered up problems in his agency.”); Keith Matheny, Supervisor 
Accused of Passing Off DNA Test, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD-EAGLE (Traverse City, 
Mich.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 1A (“A former supervisor in the Michigan State Police Crime 
Lab’s DNA analysis unit had a subordinate take a required proficiency test for him last 
year, an internal investigation found.”); James Randerson & Andy Coghlan, Forensic 
Evidence Stands Accused, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 31, 2004, at 6 (“The UK has been troubled 
this past week by revelations that flawed scientific advice given to courts may have led to 
the wrongful conviction of hundreds of men and women accused of harming their 
children.”); Vic Ryckaert, Crime Lab to Retest DNA in 64 Cases, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
July 18, 2003, at 1A (“The Marion County crime lab is reviewing 64 criminal cases—
mostly rapes and killings—because of fears that one of its lab technicians cut corners on 
DNA testing.”); Robert Tanner, Standards, Autonomy Sought for Crime Labs; 
Mishandling of Evidence, Mismanagement Cited, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A1 (“In 
Orlando, Fla., an analyst with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement admitted 
falsifying results of a test designed to check his work and his lab’s ability to analyze DNA.  
The state said that his transgression did not affect any criminal cases and that it would pay 
for retests where he was lead analyst.”). 
 27. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FBI 
LABORATORY:  AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
I.G. REPORT]; see infra notes 236–41 and accompanying text. 
 28. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FBI 
DNA LABORATORY:  A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES 
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 I.G. REPORT]; see infra notes 242–53 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Steve Bailey, Prosecutor Challenged in Ragland Murder Case, CINCINNATI 
POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at 13A (“Attorneys for both sides were in court for a hearing in which 
FBI ballistics expert Kathleen Lundy was scheduled to testify about lying during a 
preliminary hearing in Shane Ragland’s murder case.”); infra text accompanying notes 
254–65. 
 30. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in 
the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 707 (2004); infra notes 
290–309 and accompanying text. 
 31. Fred Zain was at the West Virginia lab for ten years.  See infra notes 52–58 and 
accompanying text.  Joyce Gilchrist was at the Oklahoma City lab for twenty years.  See 
infra notes 68–124 and accompanying text. 
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of the controversy as the errant work of only a “few bad apples.”32  
Forged fingerprints,33 faked autopsies,34 false laboratory reports,35 and 
perjured testimony,36 including the falsification of credentials,37 have 
all been documented.  Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court felt 
compelled to cite the “rising nationwide criticism of forensic 
                                                          
 32. This is a claim that some forensic scientists have made.  See, e.g., Tanner, supra 
note 26 (“ ‘There are always bad actors in any profession,’ said Paul Ferrara, director of 
the Virginia Division of Forensic Science.  ‘The difference is that our mistakes do not get 
buried.’ ”).  But see Janine Arvizu, Forensic Laboratories:  Shattering the Myth, 24 THE 
CHAMPION, May 2000, at 18, 20 (“The problems in these high-profile cases are a clear 
reflection of the forensic community’s widespread failure to develop and implement 
effective quality assurance programs.”).  Ferrara’s Virginia State Lab would later have its 
own problems.  See infra notes 208–35 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Boris Geller et al., A Chronological Review of Fingerprint Forgery, 44 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 963, 964–67 (1999) (discussing history of fingerprint forgeries); Mark 
Hansen, Troopers’ Wrongdoing Taints Cases, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 22, 22 (discussing 
New York police officers’ fabrication of fingerprint evidence in numerous cases). 
 34. See Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil:  Discovery of Possibly 
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24, 24 
(“If the prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that 
was what [pathologist] Dr. Erdmann reported.”) (internal quotes omitted); Chip Brown, 
Pathologist Accused of Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1992, at A24 (“[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical examiner Linda Norton was 
quoted as saying [Dr.] Erdmann routinely performs ‘made-to-order autopsies that support 
a police version of a story.’ ”); Roy Bragg, New Clues May be Dug from Grave; Furor 
Touches on Autopsies, Brains, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 28, 1992, at A1 (“[C]all him 
‘McErdmann . . . .  He’s like McDonald’s—billions served.’ ”) (quoting Dallam County 
District Attorney Barry Blackwell). 
 35. See United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Defendant 
sought to question Goldston about a former DEA colleague’s submission of falsified 
reports.  The DEA agent, Ann Castillo, had admitted to failing to perform the controlled 
substance tests upon which her reports were based.”); State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 
(Me. 1979) (FBI analyst “reported results of lab tests that he did not in fact conduct”); 
State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1978) (expert represented 
that certain lab tests were conducted when “no such tests were ever conducted”). 
 36. See supra note 29; see also Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. 2000) (en 
banc) (“It turned out that the witness presenting the dog-scent evidence in Roscoe was a 
charlatan.”). 
 37. See United States v. Gale, 314 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (observing that a 
government expert, who had testified for years in narcotics cases, “pleaded guilty to 
having committed perjury about his educational background”); Drake v. Portuondo, 321 
F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It is now apparent that Walter’s testimony concerning his 
qualifications was perjurious.”); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. 1981) (a 
FBI serologist testified that he had a master’s degree in science, “whereas in fact he never 
attained a graduate degree”); Commonwealth v. Mount, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. 1969) 
(prosecution expert “had never fulfilled the educational requirements for a laboratory 
technician”).  See generally James E. Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists, in 2  
FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 1, 7, 20–29 (Richard Saferstein ed., 1988) (discussing 
false credential cases). 
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evidence” in denying the admissibility of expert evidence in one 
case.38 
Paradoxically, these scandals are occurring as the power of DNA 
evidence to identify the guilty39 and exonerate the innocent40 is being 
reported weekly, if not daily, and while the Supreme Court is 
ratcheting up the standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence 
in its Daubert trilogy.41  The scandals have prompted Texas42 and 
Oklahoma43 to require their crime laboratories to be accredited, 
joining New York, which has mandated accreditation since 1994.44  
Moreover, in 2004, Congress required states receiving federal funds to 
designate an agency to investigate laboratory fraud and misfeasance.45  
                                                          
 38. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 853 (Fla. 2001) (excluding expert testimony 
comparing a knife with impression in cartilage). 
 39. See David Lazer, Introduction to DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 
(David Lazer ed., 2004) (“[T]hrough March 2004, 16,100 crime investigations in the 
United States had been aided through convict DNA databases.”). 
 40. See Barbara Novovitch, Free After 17 Years for a Rape That He Did Not Commit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at A18 (discussing the case of Brandon Moon, who was 
released from prison after seventeen years for a rape that he did not commit; he was the 
154th person exonerated by DNA analysis). 
 41. The Supreme Court revolutionized the standards for admitting expert testimony 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which was followed by Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999).  Daubert has been transformed over time, so that in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 
U.S. 440 (2000), the Supreme Court referred to Daubert as imposing “exacting standards 
of reliability.”  Id. at 455. 
 42. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon 2005) (requiring accreditation 
by the Department of Public Safety).  Texas also created a Forensic Science Commission.  
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (Vernon 2005). 
 43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West 2004) (requiring accreditation by the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board 
(“ASCLD/LAB”) or the American Board of Forensic Toxicology). 
 44. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995b (McKinney 2003) (requiring accreditation by the state 
Forensic Science Commission); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West 2004) (requiring 
accreditation of DNA units by ASCLD/LAB or any certifying body approved by 
ASCLD/LAB); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.156(2)(4) (West 2007) (specifying that Forensic 
Laboratory Advisory Board should encourage accreditation by ASCLD/LAB or other 
accrediting body). 
  Indiana does not require accreditation but does require “[a] laboratory conducting 
forensic DNA analysis” to “implement and follow nationally recognized standards for 
DNA quality assurance and proficiency testing, such as those approved by” ASCLD/LAB.  
See IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-14 (LexisNexis 2003). 
 45. In 2004, as part of the “Justice for All Act,” the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 was amended to require 
a certification that a government entity exists and an appropriate process is in 
place to conduct independent external investigations into allegations of serious 
negligence or misconduct substantially affecting the integrity of the forensic results 
committed by employees or contractors of any forensic laboratory system, medical 
examiner’s office, coroner’s office, law enforcement storage facility, or medical 
facility in the State that will receive a portion of the grant amount. 
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In 2005, the Virginia legislature made the Division of Forensic 
Science a separate agency under the Secretary of Public Safety46 and 
created a Forensic Science Board and Scientific Advisory 
Committee47—another byproduct of a lab controversy.48  While these 
reforms reflect improvement, they are also long overdue49 and, more 
importantly, inadequate.  All crime laboratories should be regulated 
in a comprehensive manner. 
Part I of this Article examines a number of laboratory failures.  
These examples involve both municipal and state facilities, as well as 
the FBI Laboratory, and they cover a wide variety of techniques, 
including hair comparisons, serological examinations, drug analyses, 
fingerprint identifications, and even DNA profiling, the current gold 
standard in forensic science.  In some of these cases, it is difficult to 
distinguish between malfeasance and misfeasance because the lack of 
quality assurance protocols creates an environment in which both can 
flourish undetected for long periods of time.  Moreover, some abuses 
can be traced to the lack of empirical validation of a technique—e.g., 
microscopic hair comparisons and comparative analysis of bullet lead.  
These examples demonstrate the need for regulating crime labs. 
Part II discusses the regulation of DNA profiling, which has 
developed gradually over the last twenty years, and can serve as a 
model for other laboratory units.  The complexity of DNA profiling 
forced the FBI to establish a technical working group on DNA 
analysis in 1988 in order to promulgate testing standards.50  In 1994, 
Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act,51 which authorized a 
national DNA database.  Significantly, this legislation also created a 
DNA Advisory Board to promulgate quality assurance standards and 
                                                                                                                                      
42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k(4) (West Supp. 2007). 
 46. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science into the 
Department of Forensic Science).  Previously, the Division was under the Department of 
Criminal Justice Services.  Id. 
 47. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-1109 to 9.1-1113 (2005). 
 48. See infra notes 208–35 and accompanying text. 
 49. Professor Jonakait wrote about the issue sixteen years ago.  See Randolph N. 
Jonakait, Forensic Science:  The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 191 
(1991) (“Current regulation of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory system can improve 
crime laboratories.”).  Professor Bernstein and I wrote about forensic abuses a decade 
ago.  See David Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 
YALE J. INT’L L. 123 (1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
England); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:  The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997) (discussing 
cases involving expert misconduct). 
 50. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 51. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14131–
14134 (West 2005)). 
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required proficiency testing of examiners and external audits.  This 
landmark Act was the first federal legislation regulating a forensic 
science.  Other requirements for an effective regulatory scheme 
include the accreditation of crime laboratories, the certification of 
examiners, and the standardization and promulgation of written 
protocols for each technique.  Moreover, forensic science 
commissions should be established in each jurisdiction to implement 
these and other reforms. 
I.  CRIME LAB FAILURES 
A. West Virginia 
One of the most notorious cases of crime lab failure involved 
Fred Zain, the Chief Serologist in the West Virginia State Police 
Crime Laboratory, who falsified test results in as many as 134 cases 
from 1979 to 1989.52  In reviewing a judicial report on Zain’s decade 
of misconduct, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia spoke 
of “shocking and . . . egregious violations” and the “corruption of our 
legal system.”53  The judicial inquiry concluded that “as a matter of 
law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain at any 
time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, 
unreliable, and inadmissible.”54  The report commented: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) 
overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency 
of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) 
misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple 
pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been 
tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting 
inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering 
laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous 
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all 
samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) 
failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to 
resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect 
                                                          
 52. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501, 511 (W. Va. 1993); George Castelle, Lab Fraud:  Lessons Learned from the 
Fred Zain Affair, THE CHAMPION, May 1999, at 12, 13.  A number of TV shows 
documented his abuses.  See 60 Minutes:  Right on, Fred Zain (CBS television broadcast 
Apr. 24, 1994); Dateline:  Body of Evidence, supra note 22. 
 53. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 508. 
 54. Id. at 520.  As part of the judicial inquiry, the Chairman of the Laboratory 
Accreditation Board of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors selected two 
experts to conduct an analysis of the policies, procedures, and records of the Serology 
Division during Zain’s tenure.  Id. at 503, 510–11. 
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when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (11) 
reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results.55 
Numerous defendants were imprisoned based on Zain’s 
testimony.56  In fact, Zain was such a treasured prosecution witness 
that even after he left the state to accept a position in a San Antonio 
crime lab, West Virginia prosecutors sent evidence to him for 
retesting.57  The prosecutors relied on him because the remaining 
West Virginia serologists were incapable, in their view, of reaching 
the “right” results.58 
In response to the Zain affair, the West Virginia State Police 
revamped its crime lab.59  Astonishingly, despite this effort, the lab 
continued to fall victim to misconduct.  On September 7, 2000, as a 
result of an established quality control procedure, Sergeant Timothy 
White discovered certain inconsistencies in a lab report prepared by 
chemist Todd Owen McDaniel.60  When White reported the 
inconsistencies, the State Police contacted the FBI and placed five 
members of the lab on administrative leave.61  When confronted, 
McDaniel admitted to skipping required tests on suspected marijuana 
                                                          
 55. Id. at 503; see also In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 445 
S.E.2d 165, 167 (W. Va. 1994) (“Trooper Zain’s misconduct was insidious and 
extensive.”). 
 56. See Giannelli, supra note 49, at 442–49 (examining Zain’s conduct in detail); 
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5, at 107–17 (discussing Woodall, Davis, and Harris 
exonerations). 
 57. See In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 512 (noting that a West Virginia serologist 
sent evidence to Texas for Zain to test).  Zain’s work in Texas also proved troublesome:  
“In the case of Gilbert Alejandro, the expert, Fred Zain, claimed a DNA match when in 
fact Zain had never conducted any testing beyond initial inconclusive testing and the 
DNA excluded Alejandro.”  Garrett, supra note 5 (manuscript at 35 n.109). 
 58. According to Zain’s subordinate, “several prosecutors expressed dissatisfaction 
with the reports they were receiving from serology and specifically requested that the 
evidence be analyzed by Zain.”  In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 512 n.16. 
[Serologist] Myers also testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a 
murder suspect’s jacket, it was sent to Texas, where Zain found a bloodstain which 
tested consistent with the blood of the victim. . . .  [Serologist] Bowles also testified 
that at least twice after Zain left the lab, evidence on which Bowles had been 
unable to obtain genetic markers was subsequently sent to Texas for testing by 
Zain, who again was able to identify genetic markers. 
Id. at 512. 
 59. See Messina, supra note 25. 
 60. Id. (“The trooper who discovered one of the more recent scandals at the State 
Police crime lab was placed on leave Tuesday pending an investigation of his own work 
there.”). 
 61. Press Release, W. Va. State Police, New Employees Staff Drug Lab (Oct. 2, 2000), 
www.wvstatepolice.com/news/druglab1.htm. 
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and cocaine evidence and subsequently pleaded guilty to fraud.62  
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) chemists had to take 
over the drug unit.63 
The FBI investigation found that McDaniel was not the only 
employee who ignored procedures.  The report mentioned that White 
had also violated lab policy,64 but he apparently failed to learn from 
this lesson.  In June of 2001, less than a year later, a discrepancy was 
detected in one of his reports.65  Adding to the problem, Captain Rick 
Theis, director of the lab, neglected to notify the State Police 
Superintendent, as required.66  Both White and Theis were placed on 
leave.67 
B. Oklahoma City 
Joyce Gilchrist, who began working as a forensic chemist in the 
Oklahoma City Police Department crime laboratory in 1980, is 
another prominent illustration of misconduct continuing unchecked 
for many years.68  She was also a prosecution superstar.69 
1.  Curtis McCarty Prosecution 
In 1982, Gilchrist initially excluded Curtis McCarty as a suspect 
in a rape-murder investigation based on microscopic hair 
comparison.70  After another suspect identified McCarty as the killer, 
Gilchrist reviewed a second set of hair samples from McCarty, which 
she then matched to the crime scene exemplars.71 
Two months before trial, the defense requested discovery of all 
scientific reports as well as access to hair, fiber, and serological 
                                                          
 62. See Messina, supra note 25. 
 63. See New Employees Staff Drug Lab, supra note 61. 
 64. Id.  A second civilian chemist, Mills Dillard, who was one of the lab members on 
administrative leave, resigned during the investigation.  Id. 
 65. See Messina, supra note 25. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE:  AN EXPOSÉ OF OKLAHOMA’S 
DEATH ROW MACHINE 232 (2003) (concluding that Gilchrist “appears to have used her 
lab tests to confirm the detectives’ hunches rather than seek independent scientific 
results. . . .  She treated discovery requests with contempt and kept evidence from the 
defense.  She systematically destroyed evidence at the very time when she knew that much 
of that evidence might be retested”). 
 69. See id. at 70 (noting that after “the successful prosecution of Malcolm Rent 
Johnson, Joyce Gilchrist’s star began to rise”); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of 
Scientific Evidence By Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 23 (2003) (using 
Gilchrist’s conduct as example of abuse of scientific evidence). 
 70. See FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 90. 
 71. Id. 
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samples for an independent evaluation.72  John Wilson, a Kansas City 
Police Crime Lab examiner, analyzed the evidence after being hired 
as a defense consultant.73  Gilchrist sent the samples so that Wilson 
received them on March 17, 1986, the day McCarty’s trial began.74  
Gilchrist then used her tardiness against the defense by testifying that 
Wilson could not have conducted a competent examination in the 
length of time he had the hair slides.75  Further, after Wilson testified 
that, according to Gilchrist’s report, none of the pubic hairs found on 
the victim matched McCarty’s, Gilchrist testified that she had simply 
failed to include in her report that a pubic hair found on the victim 
was consistent with McCarty’s hair.76  Additionally, Gilchrist testified 
that, based on her examination, McCarty was present at the time of 
the crime; there was no basis—scientific or otherwise—for this 
statement.77  McCarty was sentenced to death.78 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed McCarty’s 
conviction, finding that Gilchrist had improperly delayed sending her 
report, as well as the sample, to the defense expert.79  The court also 
criticized Gilchrist for omitting critical information from the report, 
labeling her conduct “trial by ambush.”80  Finally, the court found that 
Gilchrist had testified beyond the state of the art.81 
                                                          
 72. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1217–18. 
 76. Id. at 1218. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1217. 
 79. Id. (“Ms. Gilchrist’s delay and neglect in not completing her forensic examination 
and report . . . was inexcusable, since she began her forensic examination in December of 
1982.”). 
 80. Id. at 1218 (“[T]he forensic report was at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate 
and misleading. . . .  Gilchrist admitted at trial, however, that she failed to include her 
conclusion . . . in the forensic report given to Mr. Wilson.  This significant omission, 
whether intentional or inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. (“We find it inconceivable why Ms. Gilchrist would give such an improper 
opinion, which she admitted she was not qualified to give.”).  McCarty was later convicted 
at a retrial.  McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d 110 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).  However, his 
conviction was once again vacated during post-conviction proceedings due to Gilchrist’s 
misconduct.  McCarty v. State, 114 P.3d 1089, 1092 n.12 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (noting 
that a departmental “Review Board found the circumstantial evidence indicated Ms. 
Gilchrist had destroyed the evidence in order to prevent DNA testing”).  A third trial was 
subsequently aborted.  See Cheryl Camp, Convicted Murderer Is Freed In Wake of Tainted 
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A16 (reporting that trial judge released McCarty 
because the “evidence in the case against him had been tainted or destroyed by the actions 
of a former police chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, who lawyers say switched out samples to get a 
match”). 
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This was not the only trial at which Wilson and Gilchrist would 
clash.  Wilson testified against Gilchrist in another case.82  After 
examining hair evidence that, according to Gilchrist’s testimony, 
matched the defendant, Wilson reached the opposite conclusion.  
After the trial, he registered a complaint against Gilchrist with the 
Southwestern Association of Forensic Scientists (“SWAFS”), which 
conducted an investigation and concluded that Gilchrist should 
distinguish between her personal and scientific opinions.83  Despite 
this admonishment, Gilchrist was not otherwise disciplined.  In the 
end, Wilson was the one punished:  the Oklahoma City Police 
Department called Wilson’s supervisor at the Kansas City Police 
Department, complaining that he had testified against its expert.84  
Kansas City subsequently forbade him from working on private 
cases.85 
2.  Jeffrey Pierce Prosecution 
In 1985, Sandra Burton was raped in her apartment.86  When the 
police brought Jeffrey Pierce, a landscaper at her apartment complex, 
to Burton, she said that he was not the rapist.87  In addition, two 
witnesses corroborated Pierce’s alibi.88  Eight months later, however, 
Pierce was arrested, and minutes after he voluntarily agreed to 
provide head and pubic hair exemplars, Gilchrist determined that 
                                                          
 82. FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 95 (discussing the Alvin King Parker case). 
 83. See McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1219 (“[O]n December 14, 1987, Max Courtney, 
President of the Southwestern Association of Forensic Scientists, Inc., issued a prepared 
statement of the Board of Directors concerning allegations of professional misconduct 
lodged against Ms. Gilchrist.  A certified copy of this statement, which was filed with this 
Court on January 4, 1988, concluded that Ms. Gilchrist had violated the ethical code, but 
interestingly she was not disciplined.  That statement reads in relevant part:  ‘Our 
Professional Conduct Committee thoroughly investigated the allegations against Ms. 
Joyce Gilchrist and . . . communicated with [her] that she should distinguish personal 
opinion from opinions based upon facts derived from scientific evaluation . . . .  We further 
conclude that, in our system of jurisprudence, undue pressure can be placed upon the 
forensic scientist to offer personal opinions beyond the scope of scientific capabilities.’ ” 
(citation omitted)). 
 84. FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 98. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); see also FUHRMAN, 
supra note 68, at 191–210. 
 87. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 88. Id.   
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Pierce’s hairs “matched” the crime scene hairs.89  Pierce was 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison.90 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction, 
despite several troubling aspects of the case.  First, Gilchrist had 
violated a court order by failing to turn over evidence to the 
defense.91  Second, her report was incomplete.92  While the court 
acknowledged these deficiencies, it nevertheless concluded that 
Pierce’s constitutional rights had not been violated.93 
A later FBI investigation of Gilchrist’s analyses in eight cases 
determined that she had misidentified hairs in six instances and fibers 
in another.94  One of the cases was Pierce’s; the FBI found that none 
of the hairs taken from Pierce exhibited the same microscopic 
characteristics as those found at the crime scene.95  As a result, the 
Oklahoma City Police Department had the evidence retested by a 
private DNA laboratory.96  That testing exonerated Pierce, who is 
now suing Gilchrist for violating his constitutional rights.97 
                                                          
 89. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1258 (“Joyce Gilchrist testified that twenty-eight scalp hairs 
and three pubic hairs recovered from either S.B., her clothing or her apartment, were 
microscopically consistent with the characteristics found in Appellant’s hair.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1261 (“Instead of following either the letter of the Order or taking steps to 
have the Order changed or clarified by the court, she took it upon herself to determine the 
portions of the Order with which she wished to comply.  This was not her decision to 
make.”). 
 92. Id. at 1263 n.8 (“Appellant claims that it was error for Gilchrist not to set out in 
the report, her opinion that the attacker was a non-secretor.”).  At trial, Gilchrist testified 
that Pierce was a non-secretor, a person whose blood type cannot be determined through 
other body fluids, including semen.  FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 203.  Between twenty 
and twenty-five percent of the population falls into this category.  1 GIANNELLI & 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, § 17.09, at 959. 
 93. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1263–64.  Gilchrist misstated her qualifications.  Id. at 1264 
(“During the trial, Gilchrist testified that she was a member of the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences.  Appellant has provided this Court with several letters which reveal 
that at the time of trial, Gilchrist had been suspended from the organization for non-
payment of dues.”). 
 94. See SPECIAL AGENT DOUGLAS DEEDRICK, SUMMARY OF CASE REVIEWS OF 
FORENSIC CHEMIST, JOYCE GILCHRIST, OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME 
LABORATORY 1 (2001) (concluding that lab notes “were often incomplete or inadequate 
to support the conclusions reached by the examiner” and finding a lack of documentation 
“to identify textile fibers” in one of the cases and no indication of “a confirmation or 
review by another qualified examiner” in hair cases) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 95. Id. at 3 (“[T]hese [pubic] hairs do not exhibit the same microscopic characteristics 
as the suspect’s known pubic hairs.”). 
 96. DNA testing was not available at the time of Pierce’s trial in 1986. 
 97. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1300 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that Gilchrist 
does not have immunity). 
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3.  Alfred Mitchell Prosecution 
In Mitchell v. State,98 a rape-murder case tried in 1992, Gilchrist 
testified that Mitchell’s sperm had been detected on anal and vaginal 
swabs taken from the victim.99  She made this statement despite two 
key facts:  (1) pretrial DNA testing performed by the FBI (at 
Gilchrist’s request) established the absence of sperm on the swabs, 
and (2) sperm found on the victim’s panties matched the DNA of her 
boyfriend.100  Gilchrist did not turn over the FBI report to the 
defense, although, as the Tenth Circuit subsequently noted, “[t]he 
results thus completely undermined Ms. Gilchrist’s testimony.”101  The 
court went on to observe: 
Ms. Gilchrist thus provided the jury with evidence implicating 
Mr. Mitchell in the sexual assault of the victim which she knew 
was rendered false and misleading by evidence withheld from the 
defense.  Compounding this improper conduct was that of the 
prosecutor, whom the district court found had “labored 
extensively at trial to obscure the true DNA test results and to 
highlight Gilchrist’s test results,” and whose characterization of 
the FBI report in his closing argument was “entirely unsupported 
by evidence and . . . misleading.”102 
                                                          
 98. 884 P.2d 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
 99. Id. at 1199 (“Gilchrist’s findings indicated the presence of sperm in the vaginal 
and anal canals (the latter consistent with Mitchell).  Sperm consistent with Mitchell was 
also found on the medical examiner’s transport sheet in the area where [the victim’s] 
genitals lay during transport.”); see also FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 126 (noting 
Gilchrist’s testimony that the FBI’s DNA test “had been ‘inconclusive’ ”). 
 100. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1063 (10th Cir. 2001).  The appellate court 
further noted: 
[H]and-written notes taken by Ms. Gilchrist during telephone conversations with 
Agent Vick indicat[ed] that the agent had conducted two DNA probes on the 
samples.  These probes showed that the semen on the panties matched that of Mr. 
Taylor only, that no DNA was present on the rectal swab, and that the only DNA 
on the vaginal swab was consistent with the victim. 
Id. 
 101. Id. at 1064 (“An expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the DNA testing 
. . . unquestionably eliminated Mr. Mitchell . . . [and Gilchrist’s testimony was] based on 
the use of test methods Ms. Gilchrist knew were less precise than the DNA tests which 
eliminated Mr. Mitchell.  Moreover, he pointed out that one of the tests she performed in 
fact excluded Mr. Mitchell.”). 
 102. Id.; see also Gilchrist v. Bd. Rev. Okla. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 94 P.3d 72, 75 
(Okla. 2004) (“Gilchrist’s conduct in Mitchell, that is knowingly giving false and 
misleading testimony in a criminal case, constituted ‘misconduct’ sufficient to support the 
denial of unemployment benefits . . . .”). 
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4.  Malcolm Rent Johnson Prosecution 
In the trial of Malcolm Rent Johnson, another rape-murder 
prosecution, Gilchrist testified that semen recovered from the victim’s 
bed was consistent with Johnson’s blood type and that hairs found on 
the bed matched hair taken from Johnson’s arm.103  Johnson’s request 
for a defense expert to counter Gilchrist’s testimony was denied,104 
and he was convicted and then executed on January 6, 2000.105  When 
the Gilchrist scandal later erupted, Johnson’s attorneys asked for the 
evidence to be reexamined.106  Four police chemists later concluded 
that there was no sperm present on the slides taken from the victim’s 
bed.107  Yet, for her work on the Johnson case, Gilchrist had received 
a certificate of achievement.108  Questions about the execution 
linger.109 
                                                          
 103. Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1007 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); FUHRMAN, supra 
note 68, at 61; see also Johnson v. State, 823 P.2d 370 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (denying 
state habeas relief). 
 104. Johnson, 731 P.2d at 1007 (“The techniques used and manner of investigation 
were discussed on direct and on cross examination.  The test results were available for 
discovery prior to trial.  The experts called were forthright concerning their findings and 
the limitations inherent in the tests and investigation.”).  See generally Paul C. Giannelli, 
Ake v. Oklahoma:  The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004) [hereinafter Giannelli, The Right to Expert Assistance] 
(discussing the need to bolster the right to defense experts). 
 105. FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 253.  During the appeals process, Skip Palenik, a 
forensic scientist, criticized Gilchrist’s trial testimony, stating that she had testified beyond 
the bounds of accepted science when she claimed to have matched arm hair to the 
defendant.  Id. at 64.  According to Palenik, arm hairs are not individual enough for such 
comparisons.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 65–66.  The District Attorney’s office informed them that the evidence no 
longer existed.  Id. at 66.  When the defense attorney searched the evidence archives, 
however, he found the smear slides right where they were supposed to be.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 66–67 (noting that Laura Schile, an OCPD crime lab scientist, “wrote a 
memo stating that ‘spermatozoa is not present’ on six slides that Gilchrist had said 
contained semen matching Johnson’s blood type and secretor status.  Schile’s conclusions 
were supported by three other police chemists . . . .”); see also Lois Romano, Police 
Chemist’s Missteps Cause Okla. Scandal, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2001, at A1 (“But last 
July, in a startling development, the police lab stated in a memo . . . that it had recently 
reexamined the original slides purportedly containing the sperm and found no sperm 
there—contrary to Gilchrist’s claims 19 years ago.”). 
 108. FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 70. 
 109. Id. at 68 (“Even David Prater [an assistant D.A.] admits that the ‘Malcolm Rent 
Johnson case is the one case, out of the ones who have been executed, that is 
questionable.’ ”); Jim Yardley, Oklahoma Police Lab Scientist Probed; Future Executions 
Put on Hold, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2001, at 9 (“State Atty. Gen. Drew Edmondson, whose 
office began reviewing the capital cases last week . . . said he still wants to review the case 
of Malcolm Rent Johnson, who was executed in January 2000 for murdering a woman.  He 
did not offer a reason to believe Johnson was wrongly executed but said he wants to more 
thoroughly examine the case.”). 
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5.  Additional Cases 
These cases were not the only ones in which Gilchrist’s work was 
criticized.110  In Fox v. State,111 a death penalty case, the appellate 
court questioned her testimony concerning hair analysis:  “The lack of 
scientific weight of such a conclusion is apparent on reflection by 
those dealing with similar evidence on a regular basis.  But to a lay 
jury, usually ill-equipped to assimilate hair analysis findings on their 
own, such an opinion may appear too substantial.”112  In Miller v. 
State,113 the court reversed a rape conviction, noting that once again 
Gilchrist turned over hair evidence to the defense in an untimely 
manner114 and omitted crucial conclusions from her report.115  
Mitochondrial DNA analysis later exonerated Miller.116  Another 
suspect, Ronnie Lott, whom Gilchrist had cleared, was subsequently 
convicted of the crime.117 
6.  Other Problems 
A January 2001 report by the chief of the laboratory documented 
additional problems concerning Gilchrist’s job performance, 
                                                          
 110. See, e.g., Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1275 n.22 (10th Cir. 2001) (denying 
habeas relief, the court wrote:  “This court recognizes that recently information has come 
to light casting serious doubt on the veracity of Gilchrist’s testimony in a large number of 
criminal prosecutions. . . .  In fact, there is serious reason to doubt the veracity of 
Gilchrist’s testimony in this particular case.”); LaFevers v. Gibson, 238 F.3d 1263, 1266 
(10th Cir. 2001).  Denying habeas relief in LeFevers, the court wrote: 
When habeas counsel ultimately succeeded in having Exhibit 83 submitted for 
DNA testing, the testing revealed that the blood on the pants actually belonged to 
Cannon, not the victim. . . .  LaFevers asserted that . . . (1) [Gilchrist] lied when she 
asserted that the blood splatters on the pants were not sufficiently large to conduct 
electrophoresis testing; and (2) she lied when she testified that she had not 
conducted electrophoresis testing on the pants. 
Id. 
 111. 779 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (upholding a murder conviction and death 
penalty sentence). 
 112. Id. at 571.  The court also noted that “Ms. Gilchrist admitted that an individual 
could not be positively identified by hair evidence.  However, she went on to testify that, 
‘[in] her opinion . . . Mark Fowler and Bill Fox were in contact with John Barrier prior to 
death.’ ”  Id. at 571 (alteration in original). 
 113. 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). 
 114. Id. at 1319–20 (“[I]t was approximately two weeks after the deadline ordered by 
Judge Owens that Ms. Gilchrist mailed the hair evidence to the appellant’s expert.  Thus, 
appellant’s expert received the evidence six and one-half days before trial began.”). 
 115. Id. at 1320 (“What is even more disturbing . . . is the fact that Ms. Gilchrist’s 
pretrial forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a ‘unique 
characteristic’ concerning appellant’s pubic hairs.  However, in his opening argument, the 
prosecutor alerted the jury to the State’s expert’s finding of the ‘unique characteristic.’ ”). 
 116. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5, at 87. 
 117. Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
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including:  (1) missing evidence in numerous cases; (2) contamination 
issues due to evidence being “stacked all over the chemist’s area”; (3) 
systematic destruction of rape evidence after two years, well before 
the statute of limitations expired; (4) lack of peer review in many 
cases; and (5) the absence of proficiency testing, although such testing 
had been paid for.118  This review came ten years after Professor 
Starrs had criticized Gilchrist’s work in a forensic science journal.119  
He wrote:  “[I]n her missionary zeal to promote the cause of the 
prosecution she had put blinders on her professional conscience so 
that the truth of science took a back seat to her acting the role of an 
advocate.”120 
Although her conduct had been questioned for over fifteen 
years, Gilchrist’s supervisors were either unaware of the courtroom 
controversies or they did not care as long as her testimony resulted in 
convictions.121  When interviewed by Dan Rather in 2001, Wilson, the 
expert who had filed the ethics complaint against Gilchrist, succinctly 
captured the problem:  “The whole criminal justice system has 
failed.”122  He then elaborated:  “You have to look at the prosecutor’s 
office.  They must have understood what was going on with all those 
flags being waved.  The judges are no different.”123  Of the twenty-
three death penalty cases in which Gilchrist testified, twelve 
                                                          
 118. Memorandum from Captain Byron Boshell, Lab. Servs. to Major Garold Spencer, 
Investigations Bureau 16–17 (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 119. See James E. Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. SOC’Y 111 (1991). 
 120. Id. at 132–33. 
 121. Memorandum from Captain Byron Boshell, Lab Servs. to Major Garold Spencer, 
Investigations Bureau, supra note 118, at 10 (“I knew from previous articles published 
over the years that she had been the subject of scrutiny by the courts, but I assumed they 
had been addressed by the department and resolved.  I later found no indication in her 
personnel file that they had ever been investigated or addressed administratively.”).  On 
September 25, 2001, Gilchrist was discharged.  Gilchrist v. Bd. Rev. Okla. Employment 
Sec. Comm’n, 94 P.3d 72, 74 (Okla. 2004). 
 122. 60 Minutes:  Black Magic:  Under the Microscope (CBS television broadcast May 
8, 2001). 
 123. Id.; see also FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 71 (noting that Detective Bemo claimed 
that Gilchrist began giving the detectives test results that were so good “that he didn’t 
believe [she] was doing proper lab work, because her results were ‘too good.’  Bemo says 
that now, but it didn’t stop him and his partner Bill Cook from using Gilchrist’s lab results 
in many of their cases.”).  Fuhrman further notes: 
Cook had given Gilchrist the nickname “Black Magic” because she was able to get 
results that no other chemist could.  When Cook and other homicide detectives 
gave Gilchrist a hair sample from a suspect, they would often let her know that this 
was the person that they wanted to arrest. 
Id. at 91. 
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defendants have been executed.  Oklahoma now requires its 
laboratories to be accredited.124 
C. Montana 
The problems in Montana surfaced when Jimmy Ray Bromgard, 
convicted of rape in 1987,125 was exonerated by DNA testing 
sponsored by the Cardozo Law School Innocence Project—after 
serving fifteen years in prison.126  Arnold Melnikoff, the founder and 
one-time director of the Montana State Police Crime Laboratory, 
testified about hair analysis at Bromgard’s trial.127  Melnikoff used a 
statistical analysis that he had apparently invented.128  According to 
Melnikoff, “the odds were one in one hundred that two people would 
have head hair or pubic hair so similar that they could not be 
distinguished by microscopic comparison and the odds of both head 
and pubic hair from two people being indistinguishable would be 
about one in ten thousand.”129  There was no scientific basis for these 
statements. 
An independent panel of five trace evidence experts concluded 
that Melnikoff’s testimony contained “egregious misstatements” and 
demonstrated a “fundamental lack of understanding” of hair 
comparisons.130  The Innocence Project then sought out other cases in 
which Melnikoff had testified.131  As a result, DNA analysis also 
                                                          
 124. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West 2004) (requiring accreditation by the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board or the 
American Board of Forensic Toxicology). 
 125. State v. Bromgard, 862 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1993); see also CNN Presents:  
Reasonable Doubt:  Can We Trust Crime Labs? (CNN television broadcast Jan. 9, 2005) 
(examining the Bromgard case). 
 126. See Liptak, supra note 20. 
 127. See Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. 
 128. Id. (“ ‘The 1-in-100 estimate was without any scientific basis . . . .’ ”) (quoting 
Professor Walter Rowe, George Washington University). 
 129. Bromgard, 862 P.2d. at 1141. 
 130. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PEER REVIEW REPORT:  MONTANA V. JIMMY RAY 
BROMGARD 2 (“[T]here is not—and never was—a well established probability theory for 
hair comparison. . . .  If this witness has evaluated hair in over 700 cases as he claims in his 
testimony, then it is reasonable to assume that he has made many other misattributions.”) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Liptak, supra note 127 (“An F.B.I. 
report issued yesterday concluded that the scientist had misidentified the hair samples that 
were the central evidence in the case.”). 
 131. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some 
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. I) 107, 107 (2005) (“A Lexis 
search identified two other cases in which the Montana Supreme Court viewed 
Melnikoff’s hair evidence favorably and affirmed convictions.  In both cases, 
postconviction DNA testing on the original semen samples excluded the convicted 
offenders, and the men were exonerated.”). 
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exonerated Chester Bauer, convicted of rape in 1983, and Paul 
Kordonowy, convicted of rape in 1990.132  In these two cases, 
Melnikoff had also used bogus statistical analysis in his testimony.133  
When the state Attorney General refused to investigate past cases, 
the Innocence Project, along with five former Montana Supreme 
Court justices, sought review of the more than 200 cases in which 
Melnikoff had been involved.134  The Montana Supreme Court, 
however, used jurisdictional grounds to dismiss a petition that sought 
an independent audit and retesting of evidence.135 
Melnikoff had moved on to the Washington State Patrol Crime 
Lab in 1989.136  An investigation there revealed additional problems.  
An internal audit found flaws in thirty out of 100 drug-analysis cases 
assigned to Melnikoff.137 
Gilchrist and Melnikoff were not the only experts abusing hair 
comparison evidence; many of the wrongful conviction cases involved 
this type of evidence.138  In Williamson v. Reynolds,139 a federal district 
court correctly noted that microscopic hair analysis lacks scientific 
                                                          
 132. See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/52.php (Chester Bauer); http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/Content/194.php (Paul Kordonowy).   
 133. See State v. Bauer, 683 P.2d 946, 951 (Mont. 1984) (“Melnikoff estimated that the 
chances of another person having the same type of pubic and head hair were one in ten 
thousand.”); State v. Kordonowy, 823 P.2d 854, 856 (Mont. 1991) (“Arnold Melnikoff . . . 
testified that with caucasian head and pubic hair, he could microscopically distinguish an 
individual’s respective head and pubic hair from another individual’s respective head and 
pubic hair in ninety-nine out of 100 cases.”). 
 134. See Jennifer McKee, High Court Won’t Rule on Crime Lab Decision, BILLINGS 
GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 2004, at 1C. 
 135. In re Investigation in the Trace Evidence and Serology Section of the Montana 
Forensic Lab, No. 04-582, at 3–4 (Mont. 2004) (“We express no view on the serious 
matters asserted in the petition or on the extent to which the petitioners may have other 
remedies.  We conclude, however, that this Court has no authority or jurisdiction to take 
the actions requested by the petitioners via an original proceeding.”); see also McKee, 
supra note 134 (reporting four-to-three decision in which court held that it lacked 
authority to order an investigation); Possley et al., supra note 2. 
 136. McKee, supra note 134. 
 137. See Teichroeb, Oversight of Crime-Lab Staff, supra note 23 (“Washington State 
Patrol officials will notify prosecutors in seven counties that drug evidence handled by one 
of their employees—a crime lab forensic scientist facing termination—has been called into 
question.”). 
 138. See, e.g., FRED KAUFMAN, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 1 
REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL 
MORIN 83 (1998) (finding that Morin was erroneously convicted based, in part, on 
“valueless” hair evidence).  Recommendation 2 noted:  “Trial judges should undertake a 
more critical analysis of the admissibility of hair comparison evidence as circumstantial 
evidence of guilt.”  Id. at 311. 
 139. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995). 
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support.140  Williamson was later exonerated by DNA profiling, and 
the hair evidence was shown to be “patently unreliable.”141  Still 
another expert testified at Edward Honaker’s trial that the crime 
scene hair sample “ ‘was unlikely to match anyone’ ” else.142  Actually, 
hundreds or even hundreds of thousands of hair exemplars could 
have “matched.”  Honaker was also freed by DNA profiling.143  
Despite this record, courts (including in McCarty144 in Oklahoma) 
continued to admit this suspect evidence.145  Indeed, one court 
judicially noticed the reliability of hair evidence,146 implicitly finding 
this evidence indisputable,147 and yet there is an embarrassing lack of 
basic research on this “well-accepted” technique.148 
In an FBI study comparing microscopic and mitochondrial DNA 
analysis of hair, the former was wrong approximately twelve percent 
                                                          
 140. Id. at 1556.  The district court had “been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any 
indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of 
Daubert.”  Id. at 1558.  The court further observed:  “Although the hair expert may have 
followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair 
comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable.”  Id.  
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit reversed on this issue.  Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 
1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process (fundamental fairness), not the more 
stringent Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings). 
 141. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5, at 146.  See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE 
INNOCENT MAN (2006) (examining the Williamson case). 
 142. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE:  CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE 
AFTER TRIAL 58 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf. 
 143. See id. at 59. 
 144. McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d 110, 125 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (admitting hair 
evidence); see also supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997) (“Because the scientific 
principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established and of 
proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as ‘technical knowledge.’  
Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary.”); McGrew v. State, 682 
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (concluding that hair comparison is “more a ‘matter of the 
observations of persons with specialized knowledge’ than ‘a matter of scientific 
principles’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875, 
881 (Ind. 1997))). 
 146. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262–63 (Ky. 1999). 
 147. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to facts that are not subject to 
reasonable dispute); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993) 
(“[T]heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, 
such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 201.”). 
 148. See Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used 
to convict the innocent); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick A. Goodman, Forensic Hair 
Comparison Analysis:  Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1995–1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious 
science cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have done so far, 
forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”). 
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of the time—even though, in all cases reviewed, the conclusion had 
been limited to an “association” (“consistent with” testimony).149  In 
the hair cases, the lack of a scientific basis and lab protocols—limiting 
the conclusions that may be derived from the evidence—camouflaged 
the misconduct. 
D. Chicago 
John Willis was convicted of rape in 1992, despite his protests of 
innocence.150  Dr. Pam Fish, a serologist in the Chicago crime lab, 
testified that her tests were “inconclusive”—i.e., that they neither 
included nor excluded Willis as the source of semen.151  Willis, dubbed 
the “beauty shop rapist,” was convicted and sentenced to 100 years of 
imprisonment.152  Seven years later, DNA testing exonerated him.153  
At that time, Fish’s lab notes surfaced, indicating that Willis’s blood 
type (type B) excluded him as the source of the semen (type A).154  
Fish failed to acknowledge this finding in her testimony.155  After 
reviewing the file, a respected forensic scientist concluded that 
“labeling the typing of the semen stains as ‘inconclusive’ 
misrepresents the laboratory findings.”156  Willis sued, and the city, 
                                                          
 149. Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial 
DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964, 966 (2002) (“Of the eighty hairs that 
were microscopically associated, nine comparisons were excluded by mtDNA analysis.”). 
 150. See Maurice Possley & Jeremy Manier, Police Crime Lab on the Hot Seat, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 9, 1998, § 1, at 1. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Steve Mills et al., When Labs Falter, Defendants Pay:  Bias Toward 
Prosecution Cited in Illinois Cases, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, § 1, at 1. 
 154. Id. (“[Willis] had blood type B and was a secretor—that is, his blood type could be 
determined from his bodily fluids, such as semen or saliva.  The semen taken from the 
toilet tissue wrapper came from someone with blood type A.”). 
 155. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5, at 125 (“Fish’s misleading testimony in the 
Willis case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man and allowed a predator to 
continue roaming the streets, shows why the state should have turned over all of Fish’s 
laboratory notes and data, rather than merely presenting her final report.”). 
 156. Letter from George F. Sensabaugh, Professor, University of California at 
Berkeley, to Locke E. Bowman, Legal Director, The MacArthur Justice Center, 
University of Chicago Law School (Oct. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from Sensabaugh] 
(emphasis omitted) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).  Sensabaugh reached 
two more conclusions:  first, “[g]iven that Dr. Fish had reservations about the reliability of 
blood group test results and apparently did no retesting, she had an obligation to specify 
her reservations in the lab report”; and second, 
Overall, the documentation of the lab work as described in the three pages of lab 
notes is inadequate and incomplete.  Moreover, the formal lab reports describe 
results of testing for which there is no record in the lab notes.  In short, the 
documentation in this case falls short of accepted scientific standards. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
GIANNELLI.FPP 12/17/2007  2:47:57 PM 
186 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
county, and state settled for over $2.5 million, without admitting 
wrongdoing.157  The Chicago Tribune reported:  “By her own account, 
Fish could have redone the tests in the Willis case to clarify the 
results, and even her bosses still say she should have.”158  Fish was also 
involved in other wrongful convictions.159   
The problems at the Chicago lab were not limited to Fish.  Dr. 
Howard Harris, the former head of the New York City police crime 
lab from 1974 to 1985 and a former president of the American Society 
of Crime Lab Directors, was asked to examine the Chicago police 
crime laboratory in connection with a civil suit.  In his findings, Harris 
described the lab as “disorganized, poorly supervised, almost 
completely lacking in written procedures and performance standards, 
and staffed by inadequately trained workers.”160  He noted that 
“records management ‘was relegated to the lowest ranking employees 
in the laboratory, who were provided with minimal training and 
seemingly an almost complete lack of written procedures and 
standards of performance.’ ”161  Further, “[t]here was no system to 
ensure that all relevant materials were sent in response to a subpoena, 
and ‘laboratory senior supervisory personnel did not seem to know if 
there were any records of what was actually sent.’ ”162 
                                                          
 157. See Mills et al., supra note 153. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Lawyer Frees Chicago Trio After Retesting of Lab 
Sample, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A6 (discussing DNA exonerations of Omar Saunders 
and Larry Ollins after thirteen years in prison; at trial, Fish had testified there were no 
stains from a rape kit which included a vaginal swab, but the evidence reportedly showed 
that the killer was an O-secretor and that none of the defendants were).   
  Donald Reynolds and Billy Wardell, other rape defendants, were also exonerated 
by DNA.  Wardell v. City of Chi., No. 98 C 8002, 2001 WL 1345960, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
31, 2001).  Reynolds alleged that Fish had falsely testified about the results of blood tests.  
Id.  A federal court dismissed Wardell and Reynolds’ lawsuit because plaintiffs failed to 
show that a municipal policy was involved.  Id. at *6.  Thus, Fish’s culpability was not 
determined. 
 160. Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Crime Lab Disorganized, Report Says:  Consultant 
Alleges Meager Supervision, Inadequate Training, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 2001, § 2, at 1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  The Chicago lab had other problems.  Gary Dotson was convicted of the rape 
of Cathleen Webb.  CONNORS ET AL., supra note 142, at 51.  Six years later she recanted, 
stating that she had fabricated the charge.  Id. at 52.  Subsequent DNA tests excluded 
Dotson as the source of the crime-scene semen.  Id.  At Dotson’s 1979 trial, Timothy 
Dixon testified that seminal material found in Webb’s panties matched Dotson’s blood 
type.  Blake Fleetwood, From the People Who Brought You the Twinkie Defense; The Rise 
of the Expert Witness Industry, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1987, at 33, 37.  He failed to 
disclose, however, that Webb’s own vaginal discharges, not necessarily semen, could have 
caused the stains.  Id.  Years later when a Washington Post reporter asked Dixon why he 
had not spoken up.  He replied:  “I guess I wasn’t asked.”  Id.  A DNA scientist later 
remarked that “Dixon’s trial testimony was ‘exceedingly misleading and, in my judgment, 
dishonest.’ ”  Mark Thompson, DNA’s Troubled Debut, CAL. LAW., June 1988, at 43 
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In 1996, the Illinois State Police took over the city crime lab, and 
Fish was named head of the state lab’s biochemistry section.163  When 
the Willis controversy erupted, the State went back and reviewed the 
cases in which she was involved as a state examiner.  In contrast, the 
city cases were never audited.164 
E. Houston 
The Houston Police Department Crime Lab is the paradigmatic 
example of a failed forensic agency.  According to a state senator, 
“the validity of almost any case that has relied upon evidence 
produced by the lab is questionable.”165 
The story began with a television station’s investigation,166 which 
led in turn to a state audit of the lab in December 2002.167  The audit 
revealed a dysfunctional organization with serious contamination 
issues and an untrained staff using shoddy science.168  As described by 
a later investigation, the DNA unit 
was in shambles . . . operating for years without a line 
supervisor, overseen by a technical leader who had no personal 
experience performing DNA analysis and who was lacking the 
                                                                                                                                      
(quoting Edward Blake, Forensic Sciences Associates); see also Jones v. Chicago, 856 F.2d 
985, 991 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[P]olice laboratory technician Mary Furlong . . . discovered that 
George Jones had different semen and blood types from the types found in Sheila 
Pointer’s vagina.  Furlong failed to include this information in the lab report that she was 
preparing for the prosecution of Jones.”).   
 163. Possley & Mills, supra note 160. 
 164. Mills et al., supra note 153 (“But her former boss, Kearney, acknowledged that a 
review of all her cases might have been warranted.  ‘Maybe we should have gone back and 
looked at them,’ he said in a recent interview.  ‘But it didn’t happen.’ ”). 
 165. Rodney Ellis, supra note 2.  Similarly, the chair of the legislative committee 
investigating the lab has stated:  “It’s a comedy of errors, except it’s not funny.”  Adam 
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas Could Be 
Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 (quoting State Representative Kevin Bailey). 
 166. See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND 
PROPERTY ROOM 1 (2005) [hereinafter THIRD HOUSTON REPORT], available at 
http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org. 
 167. TEXAS DPS CRIME LAB HEADQUARTERS & TARRANT COUNTY ME CRIME 
LAB, QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT FOR FORENSIC DNA AND CONVICTED OFFENDER 
DNA DATABASING LABORATORIES:  HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME 
LABORATORY—DNA/SEROLOGY SECTION (2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 168. Id.; see also Nick Madigan, Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, § 1, at 20 (reporting that operations were suspended in 
December after an audit found numerous problems, “including poor calibration and 
maintenance of equipment, improper record keeping, and a lack of safeguards against 
contamination of samples.  Among other problems, a leak in the roof was found to be a 
potential contaminant of samples on tables below.”). 
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qualifications required under the FBI standards, staffed by 
underpaid and undertrained analysts, and generating mistake-
ridden and poorly documented casework.169 
As a result of these findings, the crime lab was not allowed to perform 
DNA testing for several years.170 
Some defendants who were convicted based on evidence 
provided by the lab have been exonerated.  For example, Josiah 
Sutton171 was convicted of rape in 1999 based on flawed DNA 
evidence.172  Retesting freed him.173  In 2004, six independent experts 
determined that a second man, George Rodriguez,174 had been 
convicted on serological testimony that was “false and scientifically 
unsound.”175  Rodriguez had an alibi and the police had evidence 
pointing to another person, whose DNA was later matched to the 
crime.176  A panel of experts suggested that similar problems in other 
cases should be expected.177 
                                                          
 169. THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 166, at 5. 
 170. MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR 
FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND PROPERTY 
ROOM, Executive Summary at 2 (2007) [hereinafter FINAL HOUSTON REPORT], available 
at http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/070613report.pdf. 
 171. Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2001) 
(denying appeal in which appellant asserted ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
failing to retest DNA). 
 172. See Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston 
Police Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19 (“[P]rosecutors in Mr. Sutton’s case 
had used [DNA] to convict him, submitting false scientific evidence asserting that there 
was a solid match between Mr. Sutton’s DNA and that found at the crime scene.  In fact, 
one of every eight black people, including Mr. Sutton, shared the relevant DNA profile.  
More refined retesting cleared him.”); see also Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Police 
Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab:  2 Officials Quit, Others Disciplined, HOUSTON CHRON., 
June 13, 2003, at 1A (“Christi Kim is a DNA analyst who tested the DNA used to convict 
Josiah Sutton . . . .  Police investigators cited her for incorrectly documenting the results of 
DNA profiles, failing to report the full set of DNA results in an unnamed case and making 
an incorrect data entry in an unnamed capital murder case.”). 
 173. See Liptak & Blumenthal, supra note 172. 
 174. Rodriguez v. State, 766 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
 175. EDWARD T. BLAKE ET AL., PEER REVIEW REPORT TEXAS V. GEORGE 
RODRIGUEZ 6 (2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Liptak & 
Blumenthal, supra note 172 (reporting that the panel of experts wrote “that a crime 
laboratory official—because he either lacked basic knowledge of blood typing or gave 
false testimony—helped convict an innocent man of rape in 1987”). 
 176. See Litpak & Blumenthal, supra note 172. 
 177. See Sylvia Moreno, Police Lab’s Troubles Grow:  Problems in Houston Lead to 
Moratorium on Executions, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2004, at A3 (“[T]his week, the district 
attorney’s office announced that a new, independent analysis of chemical testing used to 
convict Rodriguez found the testing was inaccurate.”). 
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Other revelations concerned the toxicology178 and ballistics179 
units of the lab.  Moreover, these problems were compounded by the 
district attorney’s failure to recuse himself from the case, as twenty-
two judges had requested.180  Two grand juries looking into the role of 
the prosecutors in the lab cases rejected the assistance usually 
provided by the D.A.’s office and called their own witnesses, thus 
becoming that rare phenomenon:  a “runaway” grand jury.181 
Texas now requires its labs to be accredited,182 and Houston 
commissioned an independent investigation of its laboratory.183  In 
the first three months, that investigation found myriad deficiencies.  
First, four instances of “dry labbing” (reporting results without doing 
tests) in the drug section were disclosed.184  These incidents were 
apparently well known within the lab.185  One of the two examiners 
involved was still employed by the laboratory, having been reinstated 
                                                          
 178. See Ralph Blumenthal, Double Blow, One Fatal, Strikes Police in Houston, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at A25 (“The acting police chief announced on Wednesday that he 
had shut down the Police Department’s toxicology section after its manager failed a 
competency test . . . .”). 
 179. Problems in the firearms identification section have also been reported.  Nanon 
Williams was convicted of a 1992 drug-related murder, and a lab expert testified that the 
victim was shot with a .25 caliber bullet.  Six years later, reviewing the case, the same 
expert determined the bullet was a .22 caliber from a co-defendant’s gun.  He admitted 
that he had never tested that weapon.  Possley et al., supra note 2.  The Houston Chronicle 
further noted: 
[T]he attorneys handling his appeal discovered that before Rousseau’s trial, 
HPD’s ballistics lab had matched the bullet that killed [the victim] to bullets from 
another killing . . . .  [A]bout one month after Rousseau was sentenced the police 
crime lab matched bullets from both shootings to a gun found on Juan Guerrero, 
who was convicted of the other murder.  Prosecutors never turned over the crucial 
findings that would have supported Rousseau’s innocence as required, his 
attorneys said. 
Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Fingers Pointed at HPD Crime Lab in Death Row Case, 
HOUSTON CHRON., April 24, 2003, at 1A. 
 180. Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, DA Office Kept in Dark on Lab, Rosenthal 
Says, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 2003, at 27A (“Rosenthal also adamantly refused to 
recuse himself from investigations of the lab’s problems, allowing for the appointment of a 
special prosecutor, despite the urging of 22 state district judges and others.”). 
 181. Adam Liptak, Prosecutions Are a Focus in Houston DNA Inquiry:  Grand Juries 
Seen as Widening Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A20. 
 182. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon 2005) (requiring 
accreditation by the Department of Public Safety to admit “[p]hysical evidence subjected 
to forensic analysis, and testimony regarding the evidence” in a criminal proceeding). 
 183. See THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 166. 
 184. See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, SECOND REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND 
PROPERTY ROOM 12 (2005), available at http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/050 
531report.pdf. 
 185. Id. at 12 n.9 (noting that discussions with witnesses “plainly established” the facts). 
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by the police chief after being removed from his position by the lab.186  
This examiner filed a harassment complaint against one of his 
superiors who had discovered the malfeasance.  They both received 
the same disciplinary sanction.187 
Second, the technical leader in the DNA unit had been removed 
and never replaced, leaving a six-year vacancy in an important 
supervisory position.188  Matters were further exacerbated when the 
lab reassigned him to head the quality assurance program, a critical 
job that he did—by his own admission—in a lackluster fashion.189  In 
short, having failed in one job, he was “booted upstairs.”190 
Third, serious backlog problems with the processing of rape kits 
remained unaddressed.  In March 2002, a lab supervisor “estimated 
that there were 19,500 sexual assault kits received by HPD that had 
never been processed, some dating as far back as 1980.”191  The lab 
was analyzing only “known suspect” cases—i.e., persons already 
arrested.192  Thus, the lab was not entering the profiles from “cold 
cases” into the national DNA database, the Combined DNA Index 
System (“CODIS”),193 where they might have generated a cold hit.  
Consequently, rapes occurred that probably could have been 
prevented.  Even with arrestees, the lab was incredibly slow.  For 
example, when Lynn Jones was charged with the sexual assault of a 
child, he remained in jail for nine months before the DNA tests that 
would eventually exonerate him were performed.194 
Fourth, in 2001, Tropical Storm Allison badly damaged thirty-
four homicide and sexual assault case files due to a leaking roof.195  
According to the investigation’s report, in 2003, “several Crime Lab 
employees told internal affairs investigators that this biological 
evidence had become so saturated with water that they observed 
                                                          
 186. Id. at 12. 
 187. Id. at 13. 
 188. THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 166, at 21. 
 189. See id. at 30 (“By Dr. Shama’s own admission, he did approximately a year’s worth 
of work in the four-plus years he remained in the position; a more exacting assessment, 
would put the volume of work performed by Dr. Sharma at much less than that.”).  
Sharma was reassigned due, in part, to conflicts with superiors.  Id. 
 190. Id. at 29–30. 
 191. Id. at 47–48. 
 192. Id. at 47. 
 193. See id. at 48 (noting that “ ‘cold case’ rape kits must be outsourced to other 
laboratories”). 
 194. Id. at 22. 
 195. Id. at 45. 
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bloody water dripping out of the boxes containing the evidence and 
pooling on the floor.”196 
Fifth, the laboratory “stopped performing lab-wide quality 
control audits in 1997,”197 and audits performed in the DNA unit (as 
required by federal standards) were superficial at best.198  The report 
noted that, although the DNA unit had successfully passed its internal 
reviews in 2000 and 2001, the 2002 external audit (using the same 
quality assurance standards) painted “a very different picture.”199  
Indeed, the section was shut down after this audit.200 
Sixth, the laboratory director was oblivious to these problems.201  
The investigation also identified poor proficiency testing results202 and 
the failure of staff to meet educational requirements.203 
The final report concluded that forty-three of the 135 DNA cases 
reviewed had “major issues,” four of which involved death row 
inmates.204  The report recommended that a special master be 
appointed to review these cases, as well as 180 suspect blood cases 
from the 1980s and early 1990s, for which convicts are still serving 
time.205  These 180 cases represented twenty-one percent of those 
reviewed—“an extraordinarily high and extremely disturbing 
proportion of cases in which to find problems of this magnitude.”206  
Local officials, however, rejected this recommendation, arguing that 
the prosecutor and courts could handle these cases.207 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 45. 
 197. Id., Executive Summary, at 5. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 51. 
 201. “On December 13, 2002, the audit team briefed Mr. Krueger on its findings.  Mr. 
Krueger recalls that the audit team told him the DNA Section was in shambles.  He told us 
that he was completely surprised by this report . . . .”  Id. at 50–51. 
 202. Id. at 61 (“We found numerous errors in the typing results in the serology 
proficiency tests.”). 
 203. Id. at 65.  The report noted: 
Mr. Bolding, who had served as the technical lead [sic] of the DNA/Serology 
Section [since 1996], lacked sufficient training and education in statistics.  Our 
preliminary reviews suggest that in several cases involving mixtures, the DNA 
analysts performed the statistical calculations incorrectly.  We also already have 
encountered deficiencies in the documentation contained in analysts’ case files. 
Id. 
 204. FINAL HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 170, Executive Summary, at 4. 
 205. Id., Executive Summary, at 12. 
 206. Id., Executive Summary, at 11. 
 207. See Joe Stinebaker, Houston Rejects Crime Lab Recommendation, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Jun. 14, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wirestory?id=3278325 
(quoting District Attorney Rosenthal) (“We have special masters . . . .  They’re called 
judges in our building.”). 
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F. Virginia 
In 1984, Earl Washington, Jr., a mentally retarded farmhand with 
an IQ of sixty-nine, was convicted of the rape-murder of Rebecca 
Williams and sentenced to death.208  Although Washington 
“confessed” to the crime, he also confessed to several other offenses 
that the police soon determined he could not have committed.209  In 
addition, his blood type (type O) did not match the type developed 
from a semen stain (type A), a fact that his trial attorney 
overlooked.210 
In 1993, Governor Douglas Wilder ordered DNA testing, which 
was conducted by Jeff Ban, a state analyst.211  On January 14, 1994, 
nine days before Washington’s scheduled execution, Wilder 
commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.212  The Governor’s 
office, however, refused to give the DNA report to the defense 
attorneys, leaving them to wonder what type of results could have led 
to a commutation but not a pardon.213  In a bizarre turn of events, the 
lab director, Paul Ferrara, gave the DNA report to a documentary 
filmmaker in 1999.214  The previously-withheld report excluded 
                                                          
 208. Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 581–84 (Va. 1984).  See generally 
MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN:  THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL 
WASHINGTON JR. (2003) (examining the Washington case); Eric M. Freedman, Earl 
Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001) (using Washington’s case to 
highlight systemic flaws in the criminal justice system). 
 209. Washington’s incriminatory statements mainly consisted of affirmative responses 
to detectives’ statements.  Freedman, supra note 208, at 1092–93.  The detectives claimed 
these statements revealed knowledge that only the perpetrator could have known.  
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 1995).  In a later civil action against 
the detectives, a document surfaced that supported Washington’s claim that his statements 
had been misrepresented at his criminal trial:  “[Detective] Wilmore said that he felt like 
either he or Hart must have mentioned the shirt to Washington before Washington said he 
left the shirt at the scene, and that his testimony in the record did not accurately reflect 
that the shirt had been first mentioned by the police.”  Id. at 277 (citation omitted).  The 
district court denied summary judgment because “Washington had proffered evidence 
from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Wilmore possessed nonpublic 
information about the crime and falsely represented that Washington had volunteered 
that information during interrogation.”  Id. at 278.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 
284.  Washington later won a $2.25 million lawsuit against Wilmore’s estate.  See Jerry 
Markon, Wrongfully Jailed Man Wins Suit:  Va. Officer Falsified Confession, Jury Rules, 
WASH. POST, May 6, 2006, at B1. 
 210. The victim’s husband was also type O.  Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1286 
(4th Cir. 1993) (finding no violation of Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of 
counsel). 
 211. See Possley et al., supra note 2. 
 212. Id. 
 213. EDDS, supra note 208, at 161. 
 214. Frontline:  The Case for Innocence (PBS television broadcast Jan. 11, 2000), 
transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cases/etc/script.html 
(discussing Washington’s case along with those of other exonerated convicts).  Henry 
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Washington as a suspect.215  Ban had eliminated Washington as the 
source of semen on a blanket but found a vaginal swab less clear.216  
This interpretation was incorrect,217 a mistake that extended 
Washington’s incarceration by six years. 
By this time, newspapers began to clamor for more information, 
leading another governor, James Gilmore, to order further testing, 
this time with a more sophisticated technique, Short Tandem Repeats 
(“STRs”).218  Surprisingly, Ban was once again chosen to conduct the 
tests.219  An unknown profile was detected on the blanket and 
matched the profile of Kenneth Tinsley, a twice-convicted rapist.220  
Gilmore then pardoned Washington, who had spent seventeen years 
in prison.221  The pardon, however, was not based on a finding of 
actual innocence, but rather on reasonable doubt.222 
Still, the matter would not rest.  Ban’s STR interpretation next 
came under attack.  The defense hired Edward Blake, a prominent 
DNA scientist, who tested duplicate slides from the Medical 
Examiner’s Office and excluded Washington as a possible match.223  
He found that Ban’s report was “logically incoherent” and 
“fundamentally flawed.”224  The Innocence Project called for an audit, 
but the laboratory director balked, rejecting the criticism as 
“unfounded” and labeling Blake a “hired gun.”225  Other experts, 
                                                                                                                                      
Erlich, who had developed the DNA test that Ban used, later concluded that Ban had 
misinterpreted the results.  EDDS, supra note 208, at 150 (noting Erlich’s conclusion “that 
these test results cast very significant doubt about Mr. Washington’s contribution to the 
sample”). 
 215. EDDS, supra note 208, at 170–71. 
 216. Id. at 170. 
 217. Although Ban found a genetic trait on the blanket that did not belong to 
Washington, the victim, or the victim’s husband, he believed Washington could not be 
eliminated.  Id.  This test involved the PCR DQ-alpha test, which is no longer used.  The 
victim’s and her husband’s genetic alleles were 4 and 4.  DIV. OF FORENSIC SCI. CENT. 
LAB., COMMONWEALTH OF VA., ASCLD/LAB LIMITED SCOPE INTERIM INSPECTION 
REPORT 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter ASCLD VA. REPORT].  Washington’s was 1.2 and 4.  Id.  
Ban found a mixture of 1.1, 1.2, and 4.  Later reviews, however, concluded that the 1.2 
should not have been reported.  Id. app., at 19.  Without the 1.2 allele finding, Washington 
would have been excluded.  The ASCLD/LAB review found that “reporting of the 1.2 
allele in the mixture . . . [was] questionable. . . .  [The] profiles . . . represented a 1.1 and 4 
pattern.”  Id. 
 218. See EDDS, supra note 208, at 171–76. 
 219. See Possley et al., supra note 2. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See EDDS, supra note 208, at 185. 
 223. See Possley et al., supra note 2. 
 224. Letter from Edward Blake, Forensic Sci. Assocs., Richmond, Cal., to Peter J. 
Neufeld (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 225. Possley et al., supra note 2. 
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however, disagreed, one arguing that the incident should have been 
reported as a quality breach under the lab’s accreditation standards.226 
On September 30, 2004, Governor Mark Warner ordered an 
audit of the Washington case by the American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board 
(“ASCLD/LAB”), which made several findings, including that Ban 
had erroneously interpreted the DNA tests.227  In addition, 
“[p]ressures from outside the laboratory and excessive managerial 
influence from within the laboratory during the STR analyses phase 
had a detrimental affect on the analyst’s decisions, examinations and 
reports in this case.”228  This pressure led to deviations from normal 
protocols.229  (The pressure was to obtain a result, not to reach a 
particular result.) 
The governor also ordered the lab to review old case files in 
which serological, but not DNA, analysis had been conducted.230  This 
review was the first random-sample case audit, albeit limited, in the 
country.231  As a result, five convicts have been exonerated,232 and a 
more sweeping review is now underway.233  Meanwhile, the Virginia 
legislature made the Division of Forensic Science a separate agency 
                                                          
 226. State DNA Lab Needs Oversight, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (HAMPTON ROADS, 
VA.), June 24, 2004, at B10. 
 227. ASCLD VA. REPORT, supra note 217, at 16 (“The analyst’s reported conclusions 
in the September 8, 2000 Certificate of Analysis with regard to the sperm fraction of Item 
58 vaginal smear are incorrect.”).  ASCLD also disagreed with the lab’s internal audit:  “It 
should be noted that the internal DFS auditors agreed with the reported results in the 
September 8, 2000, Certificate of Analysis as they pertained to the exclusion of listed 
suspects, saying the results were scientifically supported by the data in the case file.  
ASCLD/LAB disagrees.”  Id. at 13. 
 228. Id. at 17. 
 229. Id. at 13.  The erroneous conclusion resulted in part on “deviations from the 
standard protocol.”  Id. 
 230. Michael D. Shear & Jamie Stockwell, DNA Tests Exonerate 2 Former Prisoners:  
Va. Governor Orders Broad Case Review, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A1.  Evidence in 
the old cases existed only because a lab analyst, Mary Jane Burton, meticulously retained 
evidence samples from 1973 to 1988, even though she was not required to.  Id. 
 231. Press Release, Gov. Mark Warner, Gov. Warner Releases Audit of DNA Testing 
and Rape and Murder of Rebecca Williams (May 6, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review). 
 232. Editorial, A Light on Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A14. 
 233. Shear & Stockwell, supra note 230.  This review, however, has not progressed as 
quickly as it should have.  See Candace Rondeaux, Virginia DNA Review Hobbled:  As 
Crime Lab Chief Steps Down, Slow Pace Is Criticized, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2006, at B1 
(“We could see as many as 30 possible exonerations when this is all over with.” (quoting 
lab director Paul Ferrara)). 
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under the Secretary of Public Safety234 and created a Forensic Science 
Board and a Scientific Advisory Committee.235 
G. FBI Laboratory 
Although the FBI crime laboratory is widely regarded as the 
premier forensic facility in the country,236 it too has had its problems. 
1.  Explosives Unit 
The Department of Justice’s 1997 report on the FBI laboratory, 
issued by the Inspector General (“I.G.”), documented numerous 
deficiencies,237 including inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the 
competence of examiners, improperly prepared laboratory reports, 
insufficient documentation of test results, inadequate record 
management and retention, and failure to resolve serious and credible 
allegations of incompetence.238  For example, in the Oklahoma City 
bombing case, the report found that an examiner’s conclusion about 
the identity of the explosive charge was speculation and “tilted in 
such a way as to incriminate the defendants.”239  This presented 
                                                          
 234. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science into the 
Department of Forensic Science).  Previously, it was under the Department of Criminal 
Justice Services.  Id. 
 235. Id. §§ 9.1-1111 to -1112. 
 236. Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, LITIGATION, 
Winter 2000, at 51, 53 (noting that “many people regarded [it] as the foremost crime lab in 
the world”).  See generally DAVID FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE:  HOW DETECTIVES INSIDE 
THE FBI’S SCI-CRIME LAB HAVE HELPED SOLVE AMERICA’S TOUGHEST CASES (1996) 
(discussing the FBI Lab’s successes); Modern Marvels:  FBI’s Crime Lab (A&E Home 
Video 2006) (documentary). 
 237. See generally 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27, Executive Summary, pt. IA; see 
also JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 2 (1998) (concluding 
that FBI examiners “had given scientifically flawed, inaccurate, and overstated testimony 
under oath in court; had altered the lab reports of examiners to give them a pro-
prosecutorial slant; and had failed to document tests and examinations from which they 
drew incriminating conclusions, thus ensuring that their work could never be properly 
checked”); Bales, supra note 236, at 53 (“[T]he report did contain deeply disturbing 
findings of inadequate procedures, insufficient supervision, and improper conduct.”). 
 238. 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27, Executive Summary, pt. IA. 
 239. Id., Executive Summary, pt. IIIG.  Scott Bales noted: 
[T]he report concluded that an examiner from the lab’s explosives unit had erred 
by purporting to identify the particular explosives used in the [1993] World Trade 
Center and Oklahoma City bombings.  The error stemmed from the examiner’s 
reliance on information that was tied to suspects but not relevant to his scientific 
analysis. 
Bales, supra note 236, at 52.  The New York Times further explained: 
Two laboratory workers said [the chief laboratory examiner] had changed their 
dictated reports, in violation of F.B.I. policy.  They said he made slight alterations 
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federal prosecutors with a significant dilemma,240 which they solved 
by going outside the country to obtain a bomb expert from the 
Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom.241 
The report’s recommendations are riveting in their simplicity.  
They include:  (1) seeking ASCLD/LAB accreditation; (2) requiring 
examiners in the Explosives Unit to have scientific backgrounds in 
chemistry, metallurgy, or engineering; (3) mandating that each 
examiner who performs work prepare and sign a separate report 
instead of a composite report “without attribution to individual 
examiners”; (4) establishing report review procedures by unit chiefs; 
(5) preparing adequate case files to support reports; (6) monitoring 
court testimony in order to preclude examiners from testifying to 
matters beyond their expertise or in ways that are unprofessional; and 
(7) developing written protocols for scientific procedures.242 
2.  DNA Unit 
A second I.G. Report (2004) focused on Jacqueline Blake, who 
was hired by the FBI in 1988 as a serologist.243  From March 2000 to 
June 2002, she worked with DNA-Polymerase Chain Reaction 
                                                                                                                                      
in the wording of reports to eliminate uncertainties in the explosives evidence and 
making it easier for prosecutors to present the evidence as unequivocally 
consistent with the Government’s theory of the case. 
David Johnston, F.B.I. Lab Practices Faulted in Oklahoma Bomb Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 1997, at A1. 
 240. See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding Nichols’s 
conviction despite a defense challenge to refusing a witness’s testimony that would have 
criticized the FBI’s handling of the case); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (upholding McVeigh’s conviction despite challenges to evidentiary rulings). 
 241. Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1261–62 (“Mr. Nichols next contends the district court erred 
when it permitted Linda Jones, a forensic explosives expert from the Ministry of Defense 
in England, to give opinions about the type and size of the bomb that destroyed the 
Murrah building.”). 
 242. See generally 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27, Executive Summary, pt. VII 
(summarizing these recommendations).  With respect to the fourth recommendation, the 
report commented:  “Our central point is that peer review by qualified personnel is an 
essential aspect of a high-performing forensic science laboratory.  The Rudolph matter, 
certain conclusions in the Oklahoma City report, and other cases demonstrate the 
importance of vigorous, substantive peer review.”  Id.  Addressing the fifth 
recommendation, it elaborated: 
The Rudolph files and some of Martz’s work underscore the importance of case 
files containing all of the documentation necessary for another appropriately 
qualified examiner to be able to understand and replicate the examiner’s data and 
analysis.  We encountered the problem of incomplete or missing documentation in 
many case files. 
Id. 
 243. 2004 I.G. REPORT, supra note 28, at 8. 
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(“PCR”).244  For two years, while performing analyses on crime scene 
evidence in more than 100 cases, she failed to complete negative 
control tests, a required part of the lab protocol designed to identify 
whether contamination has been introduced into the process.245  This 
omission “rendered her work scientifically invalid and unusable in 
court.”246  In addition, she falsified lab documents to conceal her 
misdeeds.247  In May 2004, she pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge of providing false information in her lab reports.248 
Several aspects of this affair warrant further attention.  First, 
although the FBI was an accredited laboratory by this time and thus 
subject to audits, Blake’s malfeasance was not revealed through 
established safeguards, but rather by accident.249  As the I.G. Report 
observed, “weaknesses in DNA [Unit I] procedures and protocols 
allowed a technician routinely to disregard required steps in the 
analysis of DNA, even while the Unit received clean audit reports 
from both internal and external auditors and while the Unit was 
accredited by ASCLD/LAB.”250 
Second, in reviewing the laboratory’s protocols, the I.G. Report 
identified several significant problems: 
[I]n approximately 20 percent of the protocol sections we 
reviewed we identified one or more of the following 
deficiencies:  1) the protocol lacks sufficient detail; 2) the 
protocol fails to inform the exercise of staff discretion; 3) the 
protocol fails to ensure the precision of manual notetaking; and 
4) the protocol is outdated.251 
                                                          
 244. Id. at i. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  Blake was a technician, not an examiner, and therefore did not testify. 
By itself, however, the failure to process the negative controls does not change the 
test results or lead to a particular testing outcome (e.g., creating a match between 
a known and unknown evidence sample).  The retesting of evidence in Blake’s 
cases to date indicates that, while she did not properly conduct the contamination 
testing, the DNA profiles that she generated were accurate. 
Id.  In some cases, however, her testing consumed all the available DNA in the case.  Id. at 
ii. 
 247. Id. at i. 
 248. Id. at ii. 
 249. Id. (“In April 2002, a colleague of Blake was working late one evening after Blake 
had left the Laboratory for the day, and noticed that the testing results displayed on 
Blake’s computer were inconsistent with the proper processing of the control samples.”). 
 250. Id. at 21.  Blake also failed to run the negative controls in her qualifying and 
proficiency tests, but this was not detected at the time.  Id. at 40–41. 
 251. Id. at 130. 
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Third, the FBI’s response to this incident proved insufficient in 
some important respects.  The agency’s audit covered only the two 
years when Blake worked as a PCR Biologist but should have 
extended to the prior twelve years, when she was a serologist and 
then a Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (“RFLP”) 
analyst.252  In addition, the Office of General Counsel failed to 
appreciate the seriousness of the problem when informed of it.253 
3.  Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
a. The Examiner 
As part of her job responsibilities, Kathleen Lundy, an FBI 
examiner, performed comparative bullet lead analysis (“CBLA”), a 
process that compares trace chemicals found in bullets at crime scenes 
with ammunition found in the possession of a suspect.254  For over 
thirty years, FBI experts had testified about bullet lead composition, a 
technique that was first used in the investigation into President 
Kennedy’s assassination.255  The technique was not seriously 
challenged until a retired FBI examiner, William Tobin, began 
questioning the procedure in scientific and legal journals,256 as well as 
in-court testimony.257 
                                                          
 252. Id. at 67. 
 253. Id. at 65 (“[T]he Laboratory did not receive the quality of legal services that one 
would expect from FBI OGC, and Laboratory management was not sufficiently assertive 
when soliciting legal advice.”). 
 254. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS:  WEIGHING BULLET LEAD 
EVIDENCE 1–2 (2004).  The Council is the research arm of the National Academies, 
formerly the National Academy of Sciences.  Various analytical techniques (e.g., neutron 
activation analysis, inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry) have been 
used to determine the concentrations of seven elements—“arsenic (As), antimony (Sb), 
tin (Sn), copper (Cu), bismuth (Bi), silver (Ag), and cadmium (Cd)—in the bullet lead 
alloy of both the crime-scene and suspect’s bullets.”  Id. at 2.  Statistical tests are then used 
to compare the elements in each bullet:  “If any of the fragments and suspect’s bullets are 
determined statistically to be analytically indistinguishable for each of the elemental 
concentration means, they probably came from the same ‘source.’ ”  Id. 
 255. See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the JFK 
Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical Perspectives, 51 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 717 (2006) (discussing the original analysis of the bullet fragments). 
 256. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence:  Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43 
(2003); Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead 
Compositional Analysis, 127 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 174 (2002) (Tobin was a coauthor); 
William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative is Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis?, CRIM. JUSTICE, Fall 2002, at 26. 
 257. See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons v. State, 
896 A.2d 1059, 1068 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 339–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005) (Tobin’s affidavit submitted).  Although a metallurgist, Tobin worked in a 
different section of the lab; he was not a CBLA examiner. 
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In Ragland v. Commonwealth,258 a Kentucky murder case, Lundy 
got herself in trouble while testifying at a pretrial admissibility 
hearing.259  She stated that the elemental composition of a .243 caliber 
bullet fragment removed from the victim’s body was “analytically 
indistinguishable” from bullets found at the home of the defendant’s 
parents.260  Lundy further testified that the Winchester Company 
purchased its bullet lead in block form prior to 1996 and then 
remelted it at its manufacturing plant.261  During cross-examination at 
trial, however, Lundy admitted that she knew prior to the hearing 
that Winchester had purchased its lead in billet form in 1994.262  This 
was not a minor point.  Millions more bullets could have the same 
“source” if they were last melted by a secondary smelter instead of by 
Winchester.263  Lundy subsequently admitted to her superiors that she 
had lied,264 and on June 17, 2003, she pleaded guilty to testifying 
falsely and was sentenced to a suspended ninety-day jail sentence and 
a $250 fine.265 
                                                          
 258. 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006). 
 259. Id. at 580; see Dan Eggen, FBI Laboratory Moves to New Home, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 25, 2003, at A21 (discussing Lundy’s erroneous testimony and her subsequent 
indictment); Joseph Gerth, Judge Rules Attorney’s Office Can Remain on Ragland Case, 
LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Oct. 19, 2002, at B4 (addressing the aftermath of Lundy’s false 
testimony); John Solomon, FBI Lab Still Plagued by Problems, CINCINNATI POST (Ohio), 
Apr. 16, 2003, at 20 (“Weeks after testifying at a court hearing in a Kentucky murder, FBI 
scientist Kathleen Lundy told her superiors a secret.  She knowingly gave false testimony 
about her specialty of lead bullet analysis.”). 
 260. Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 574. 
 261. Id. at 580. 
 262. Id. (“Lundy admitted that her testimony at the Daubert hearing was false and that 
she knew prior to the Daubert hearing that Winchester purchased its bullet lead in billets 
in 1994.”). 
 263. The court noted this point in Ragland: 
The significance of the difference is that Winchester’s furnace has only a 15,000-
pound capacity whereas some secondary smelters melt lead in crucibles having up 
to 200,000-pound capacities.  Lundy testified that approximately one million 
bullets can be manufactured from a 15,000 pound melt.  If so, approximately 
thirteen million bullets can be manufactured from a 200,000 pound melt, 
significantly increasing the number of bullets that would be analytically 
indistinguishable . . . . 
Id. at 576. 
 264. See Charles Piller & Robin Mejia, Science Casts Doubt on FBI’s Bullet Evidence, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at A1 (reporting that, in a sworn affidavit, Lundy “admitted that 
her trial testimony was untruthful” and that she “blamed her conduct partly on a sense of 
crisis in her work, fed by ‘new and repeated challenges to the validity of the science 
associated with bullet lead comparison analysis’ ”). 
 265. Mark Pitsch, Ex-FBI Scientist Pleads Guilty, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., June 18, 
2003, at B1; see also Maurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis by FBI, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 11, 2004, § 1, at 14 (noting Lundy’s conviction and fine as an example of why 
bullet lead analysis has fallen under intense scrutiny in recent years); Prosecutors 
GIANNELLI.FPP 12/17/2007  2:47:57 PM 
200 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
b. The Technique 
The underlying problems with CBLA went beyond Lundy’s 
prevarication.  Although CBLA evidence had been used in trials for 
over three decades, few studies had been published on the 
technique.266  Nevertheless, until recently, the courts admitted this 
evidence.  The published cases reveal a wide variety of interpretive 
conclusions.  In some cases, experts testified only that two exhibits 
were “analytically indistinguishable.”267  In other cases, experts 
concluded that samples could have come from the same source or 
“batch”268; in still others, experts stated that the samples came from 
the same source.269  The testimony in a number of cases went further 
and referred to a “box” of ammunition (usually fifty loaded 
cartridges, sometimes twenty).  For example, two specimens: 
• could have come from the same box270; 
• could have come from the same box or a box 
manufactured on the same day271; 
• were consistent with their having come from the same 
box of ammunition272; 
• probably came from the same box273; 
• must have come from the same box or from another box 
that would have been made by the same company on 
the same day.274 
                                                                                                                                      
Challenged in Ragland Murder Case, CINCINNATI POST (Ky.), Sept. 6, 2002, at 13A 
(“Attorneys for both sides were in court for a hearing in which FBI ballistics expert 
Kathleen Lundy was scheduled to testify about lying during a preliminary hearing in 
Shane Ragland’s murder case.”). 
 266. The overwhelming majority of cases were homicide prosecutions, some of which 
were capital cases.  Because there are few federal homicide prosecutions, CBLA evidence 
was most commonly used in state prosecutions.  See infra notes 267–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 267. See Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
 268. See State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012–13 (Or. 1974) (en banc). 
 269. See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v. Lane, 
628 N.E.2d 682, 689–90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“He testified that the two bullets were 
analytically indistinguishable.  Special Agent Riley opined that the two bullets came from 
the same source and that the match was as good as he had ever seen in his twenty years with 
the FBI.”) (emphasis added). 
 270. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Jones, 425 
N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981). 
 271. See State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson, 499 
N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986); Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) 
(en banc) (“He later modified that statement to acknowledge that analytically 
indistinguishable bullets which do not come from the same box most likely would have 
been manufactured at the same place on or about the same day; that is, in the same 
batch.”), vacated, 509 U.S. 917 (1993). 
 272. See State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 187, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1982). 
 273. See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
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Several other (and different) statements appear in the opinions.  
An early case reported that the specimens “had come from the same 
batch of ammunition:  they had been made by the same manufacturer 
on the same day and at the same hour.”275  One case reports the 
expert’s conclusion with a statistic.276  In another case, the court 
discussed the expert’s testimony using the expressions “such a finding 
is rare”277 and “a very rare finding.”278  In still another case, the expert 
“opined that the same company produced the bullets at the same 
time, using the same lead source.  Based upon Department of Justice 
records, she opined that an overseas company called PMC produced 
the bullets around 1982.”279  Thus, FBI experts ignored the limitations 
of the technique in many cases.  Further, as these cases demonstrate, 
the testimony was not consistent among the Bureau’s own experts, 
suggesting that the FBI was not monitoring the trial testimony. 
In 2004, a National Research Council report undercut much of 
the FBI expert testimony:  “The available data do not support any 
statement that a crime bullet came from a particular box of 
ammunition.  In particular, references to ‘boxes’ of ammunition in 
any form should be avoided as misleading under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403.”280  The most disturbing case is Earhart v. State,281 a 
                                                                                                                                      
 274. See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666 (8th Cir. 1996) (“An expert testified 
that such a finding is rare and that the bullets must have come from the same box or from 
another box that would have been made by the same company on the same day.”); 
Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194, 207 (Mass. 1992) (“Special agent John Riley at 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that two bullet fragments found in [the 
victim’s] body came from the same box of ammunition or from different boxes that were 
manufactured at the same place on or about the same date as a bullet retrieved from [the 
defendant’s basement].”); State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 465, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (2001) 
(“[Kathleen Lundy] opined that, based on her lead analysis, the bullets she examined 
either came from the same box of cartridges or came from different boxes of the same 
caliber, manufactured at the same time.”). 
 275. Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added). 
 276. Earhart, 823 S.W.2d at 614. 
 277. Davis, 103 F.3d at 666. 
 278. Id. at 667. 
 279. People v. Villarta, No. H021354, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4776, at *15 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2002).  In recent years, the testimony became more limited.  A 2002 FBI 
publication states the conclusion as follows:  “Therefore, they likely originated from the 
same manufacturer’s source (melt) of lead.”  Charles A. Peters, The Basis for 
Compositional Bullet Lead Comparisons, FORENSIC SCI. COMM., July 2002, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2002/peters.htm (emphasis added).  Testimony 
to the same effect has also been proffered.  Transcript of Record at 6, Commonwealth v. 
Wilcox, No. 00CR2727 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 28, 2002) (trial testimony of 
Charles Peters, FBI examiner) (“Well, bullets that are analytically indistinguishable likely 
come from the same molten sources of lead, uh, as opposed to bullets that have different 
compositions come from different, uh, melts of lead.”). 
 280. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 254, at 7. 
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capital murder case in which the CBLA evidence apparently played a 
significant role.282  The transcript contains the following expert 
testimony:  “We can—from my 21 years experience of doing bullet 
lead analysis and doing research on boxes of ammunition down 
though the years I can determine if bullets came from the same box of 
ammunition . . . .”283  The amount of bullets that can be produced 
from a melt, however, “can range from the equivalent of as few as 
12,000 to as many as 35 million 40-grain, .22 caliber longrifle 
bullets.”284  Earhart was subsequently executed.285 
In 2003, a federal district court excluded CBLA testimony under 
the Daubert standard,286 and in 2005, a New Jersey appellate court 
reversed a conviction involving CBLA evidence, finding it was “based 
on erroneous scientific foundations.”287  The FBI discontinued CBLA 
testing in 2005, although the Bureau maintained that the test was 
                                                                                                                                      
 281. 823 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  The court summarized the flawed 
testimony: 
He concluded that the likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same 
batch, based on all the .22 bullets made in one year, is approximately .000025 
percent, ‘give or take a zero.’  He subsequently acknowledged, however, that the 
numbers which he used to reach the .000025 percent statistic failed to take into 
account that there are different types of .22 caliber bullets made each year . . . . 
Id. at 614 (emphasis added). 
 282. See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying habeas relief, 
the court noted:  “Given the significant role the bullet evidence played in the prosecution’s 
case, we shall therefore assume Earhart could have made a sufficient threshold showing 
that he was entitled to a defense expert under Texas law.”). 
 283. Transcript of Record at 5248–49, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee County, 
21st Judicial Dist., Texas (testimony of John Riley).  Riley testified:  
Well, bullets that are . . . analytically indistinguishable compositions . . . typically 
are found within the same box of ammunition and that is the case that we have 
here.  Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be found in other boxes 
of ammunition, but it’s most likely those boxes would have been manufactured at 
the same place on or about the same date. 
Id. at 5258.  But see Transcript of Record, supra note 279, at 1–2 (Daubert testimony of 
Charles Peters).  In a Daubert hearing, Peters noted: 
We have never testified, to my knowledge, that that bullet came from that box.  
We’d never say that.  All we are testifying is that that bullet, or that victim 
fragment or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes 
that were produced at the same time. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 284. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 254, at 6. 
 285. See Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (search for “Earhart” under “Find 
Person” search box) (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).  
 286. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003). 
 287. State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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reliable.288  Other courts rejected this type of evidence the following 
year.289 
4.  Fingerprint Unit 
a. The Mayfield Affair 
Like many other forensic sciences, fingerprint comparisons 
gained judicial acceptance long before the demanding Daubert 
standard became operative.290  Numerous attacks, albeit unsuccessful, 
have been launched against fingerprint evidence in recent years.291  In 
many of these cases, FBI examiners testified that there is a “zero 
error” rate in fingerprint examinations.292  Although courts have 
accepted this astounding statement, the investigation of the terrorist 
train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 191 and 
                                                          
 288. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets from Crime Scene, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A2; see also John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the FBI had failed to take adequate 
steps to notify affected defendants and courts of the NRC report’s negative conclusions). 
 289. See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting that “[i]f 
the FBI Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now considers such evidence to be 
of insufficient reliability to justify continuing to produce it, a finding by the trial court that 
the evidence is both scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous”); 
Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Md. 2006) (“CBLA is not admissible under the 
Frye-Reed standard because it is not generally accepted within the scientific community as 
valid and reliable.”); id. at 1078 (“Based on the criticism of the processes and assumptions 
underlying CBLA, we determine that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony 
based on CBLA because of the lack of general acceptance of the process in the scientific 
community.”).  Other defendants have not been as fortunate.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fisher, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (Pa. 2005) (“The CBLA evidence, at best, established a possible 
connection between Appellant and the bullets recovered from the victim’s body.”); see 
also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Davis’s trial counsel cannot 
be said to be ineffective for failing to challenge the FBI’s methodology on a basis that was 
not advanced by the scientific community at the time of trial.”). 
 290. The first reported case was People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). 
 291. See generally Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence:  Fingerprint Admissibility 
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004) 
(discussing the post-Daubert fingerprint challenges); Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprint 
Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 43 (2001) (“[W]hat is 
striking, even astonishing, is that no serious effort to challenge either the weight or 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence ever emerged—until 1999.”); Sandy L. Zabell, 
Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 170 (2005) (“The argument that no latent print 
has ever been found to match the rolled print from a different person is . . . misleading 
because no systematic search for such pairs on the entire databank of millions of 
fingerprints has ever been performed.”). 
 292. See, e.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (“The 
government claims the error rate for the method is zero.”), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
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injured 2,000, undermined this claim.293  The FBI got it wrong, 
misidentifying Brandon Mayfield, a Portland lawyer, as the source of 
the crime scene prints.294 
To its credit, the FBI initiated an investigation using outside 
experts.  The resulting report295 raised a number of disquieting issues.  
First, the “dissimilarities [between prints] . . . were easily observed 
when a detailed analysis of the latent print was conducted.”296  In 
short, it was not a difficult fingerprint to interpret.  Second, the 
mistake was attributed in part to “confirmation bias”297—a well-
established phenomenon that is frequently ignored in forensic 
work.298  In other words, once the examiner made up his mind, he saw 
what he expected to see during reexaminations.  Third, a review by 
another examiner was not conducted blind—i.e., the reviewer knew 
that a positive identification had already been made299—and thus was 
also subject to the influence of confirmation bias.  Fourth, the culture 
at the laboratory was poorly suited to detecting mistakes.  As the 
report noted, “[t]o disagree was not an expected response.”300  Fifth, 
proficiency testing was apparently not sufficiently rigorous.301  
Surprisingly, the report repeatedly alluded to the need to be cautious 
due to the “inherent pressure of a high-profile case,”302 leaving one to 
wonder about the routine case. 
The I.G. also reviewed the Mayfield case.303  Among other 
things,304 the I.G. Report concluded that “the misidentification could 
                                                          
 293. See Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held Lawyer 
in Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A1. 
 294. See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 5, 2004, at A1 (reporting that Spanish authorities cleared Brandon Mayfield and 
matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national); Flynn McRoberts & Maurice Possley, 
Report Blasts FBI Lab:  Peer Pressure Led to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 1. 
 295. Stacey, supra note 30. 
 296. Id. at 714. 
 297. Id. at 713. 
 298. See infra notes 399–413 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive bias). 
 299. Stacey, supra note 30, at 715.  Indeed, a third expert, from outside the FBI, also 
confirmed the identification.  Id. at 709. 
 300. Id. at 713. 
 301. Id. at 716 (“Verifiers should be given challenging exclusions during blind 
proficiency tests to ensure that they are independently applying ACE-V methodology 
correctly . . . .”). 
 302. Id. at 713, 716. 
 303. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A 
REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, UNCLASSIFIED 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 I.G. REPORT]. 
 304. The I.G. Report also highlighted the lack of blind verification:  “[U]nder 
procedures in place at the time of the Mayfield identification, the verifier was aware that 
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have been prevented through a more rigorous application of several 
principles of latent fingerprint identification.”305  In addition, a 
significant cause of the misidentification was “reasoning ‘backward’ 
from features that were visible in the known prints of Mayfield.”306  
As the Report explained:  “Having found as many as 10 points of 
unusual similarity, the FBI examiners began to ‘find’ additional 
features in [the print] that were not really there, but rather were 
suggested to the examiners by features in the Mayfield prints.”307  
After noting the controversy among examiners about Level 3 details, 
the Report concluded that the examiners “apparently misinterpreted 
distortions in [the print] as real features corresponding to Level 3 
details seen in Mayfield’s known fingerprints.”308  Furthermore, the 
FBI Lab ignored the possibility that it had erred:  “FBI examiners did 
not attempt to determine the basis of the [Spanish National Police’s] 
doubts before reiterating that they were ‘absolutely confident’ in the 
identification on April 15, a full week before the FBI Laboratory met 
with the SNP.”309 
                                                                                                                                      
an identification had already been made by a prior FBI examiner at the time he was 
requested to conduct the verification.”  Id. at 10–11. 
 305. Id. at 6. 
 306. Id. at 7. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 8 (“Because Level 3 details are so small, the appearance of such details in 
fingerprints is highly variable, even between different fingerprints made by the same 
finger.  As a result, the reliability of Level 3 details is the subject of some controversy 
within the latent fingerprint community.”).  Level 1 details are general ridge patterns—
whorls, loops, and arches.  Level 2 features involve ridge characteristics, such as ridge 
endings, bifurcations, islands, and dots.  Level 3 features are “even smaller details of the 
number and shape of the [sweat] pores on the ridges.”  GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, 
supra note 12, § 16.07[a], at 897. 
 309. 2006 I.G. REPORT, supra note, 303, at 10.  The I.G. made several 
recommendations that went beyond the Bureau’s internal report: 
These include recommendations that the Laboratory [1] develop criteria for the 
use of Level 3 details to support identifications, [2] clarify the “one discrepancy 
rule” to assure that it is applied in a manner consistent with the level of certainty 
claimed for latent fingerprint identifications, [3] require documentation of features 
observed in the latent fingerprint before the comparison phase to help prevent 
circular reasoning, [4] adopt alternate procedures for blind verifications, [5] review 
prior cases in which the identification of a criminal suspect was made on the basis 
of only one latent fingerprint searched through IAFIS [Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System], and [6] require more meaningful and 
independent documentation of the causes of errors as part of the Laboratory’s 
corrective action procedures. 
Id. at 14. 
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b. Other Mistakes 
The Mayfield imbroglio was not the only fingerprint mishap 
recently reported.310  Stephan Cowans was released after serving six 
years in a Massachusetts prison for the nonfatal shooting of a police 
officer.311  His was the first conviction overturned on DNA evidence 
in which fingerprint evidence had been crucial in securing the 
wrongful conviction.312  Commenting on the case, Professor Mnookin 
wrote:  “[T]he fingerprint community has little motivation to 
investigate how often they make mistakes.  Fingerprint examiners 
regularly assert in court that the technique is error-free and that 
fingerprint matches are a sure thing. . . .  [F]ingerprints cannot 
possibly be as perfect a technique as the experts presently claim.”313 
Riky Jackson’s prints were similarly misidentified.  He was 
convicted of murder in 1997 based on bloody fingerprints discovered 
on a window fan.314  The police expert, Anthony Paparo, matched 
eleven friction points to Jackson’s prints.315  At trial, Paparo and two 
other prosecution experts testified to a match.  In contrast, two 
defense experts, both retired FBI examiners, testified that there was 
no match.316  Nevertheless, Jackson was convicted and sentenced to 
life imprisonment.317  Frustrated, the defense experts filed a complaint 
with the International Association of Identification concerning the 
                                                          
 310. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero:  Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1001–16 (2005) (collecting twenty-two 
cases involving mistakes).  Other problematic fingerprint cases include Imbler v. Craven, 
298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (expert failed to observe an exculpatory fingerprint in a 
murder case, in which the death penalty was imposed), aff’d, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) 
and State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982) (“The fingerprint expert’s 
testimony was damning—and it was false.”).  See also Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints 
Lie?, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96 (discussing a holding by a Philadelphia judge that 
limited the use of fingerprint evidence due to scientific fallibility); James E. Starrs, A 
Miscue in Fingerprint Identification:  Causes and Concerns, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 
287 (1984) (discussing the misidentification of fingerprints in State v. Caldwell). 
 311. Commonwealth v. Cowans, 756 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (“A 
fingerprint left on the glass mug was matched to the defendant.”). 
 312. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter, Contaminated Evidence, 304 
SCIENCE 959, 959 (2004) (“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly unwilling to confront 
and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome through sheer force of 
will and good intentions.”). 
 313. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Editorial, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2004, at A15. 
 314. Flynn McRoberts et al., Forensics Under the Microscope:  Unproven Techniques 
Sway Courts, Erode Justice, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, § 1, at 1. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See CNN Presents:  Reasonable Doubt:  Can We Trust Crime Labs? (CNN 
television broadcast Jan. 9, 2005). 
 317. Id. 
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prosecution experts’ testimony.318  This triggered an FBI review, 
which concluded that the government experts had erred.319  Jackson 
was released from prison.320 
c. Lack of Research 
Another distressing revelation surfaced in United States v. 
Mitchell,321 the first post-Daubert attack on fingerprint evidence.  In 
March 2000, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”), the research 
arm of the Department of Justice, released a solicitation for 
fingerprint research.  The “Introduction” to the solicitation stated 
that Daubert “require[d] scientists to address the reliability and 
validity of the methods used in their analysis.  Therefore, the purpose 
of this solicitation is to . . . provide greater scientific foundation for 
forensic friction ridge (fingerprint) identification.”322  After the 
Mitchell trial, the defense attorney learned that the solicitation had 
been postponed, arguably so it could not be used in Mitchell to 
support the defense challenge.323  The Third Circuit commented on 
the testimony of Dr. Richard Rau, the NIJ official who coordinated 
the drafting of the solicitation for the Department of Justice: 
We are deeply discomforted by Mitchell’s contention—
supported by Dr. Rau’s account of events, though contradicted 
by other witnesses—that a conspiracy within the Department of 
Justice intentionally delayed the release of the solicitation until 
after Mitchell’s jury reached a verdict.  Dr. Rau’s story, if true, 
would be a damning indictment of the ethics of those 
involved.324 
                                                          
 318. Id. 
 319. See 60 Minutes:  The Fallibility of Fingerprints As Evidence (CBS television 
broadcast Jan. 5, 2003).   
 320. Id. 
 321. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 322. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLICITATION:  FORENSIC FRICTION RIDGE 
(FINGERPRINT) EXAMINATION VALIDATION STUDIES 3 (2000). 
 323. See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert:  The Myth of Fingerprint 
“Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 628 n.122 (2002) (“Internal documents of 
the NIJ presently on file with the author . . . reveal that the Institute was ready to publish 
the Solicitation in September of 1999, but that at the FBI’s request, publication was 
delayed until after Mitchell’s trial.”).  Epstein was the defense counsel in Mitchell. 
 324. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 255.  The court also noted: 
[Mitchell’s] most damaging evidence came from Dr. Richard Rau of the NIJ, who 
coordinated the drafting of the solicitation.  Rau testified to conversations at a 
September 1999 meeting among himself, Donald Kerr (the Assistant Director of 
the FBI in charge of the FBI crime laboratory), David Boyd (the Deputy Director 
of the NIJ), and others.  Rau claimed that at that meeting Kerr and Boyd agreed 
to withhold release of the solicitation until the end of Mitchell’s trial.  In response 
GIANNELLI.FPP 12/17/2007  2:47:57 PM 
208 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
Moreover, a subsequent attempt to establish an empirical basis 
for fingerprints was thwarted.  An editorial in the prestigious 
scientific journal Science, entitled “Forensic Science:  Oxymoron?” 
and written by the editor in chief, discussed the cancellation of a 
National Academies project designed to examine various forensic 
science techniques, including fingerprinting, because the Departments 
of Justice and Defense insisted on a right of review that the 
Academies had refused to other grant sponsors.325  In sum, not only is 
there a lack of empirical support for fingerprints,326 but the 
proponents of the technique are undercutting efforts to establish such 
a basis.327 
II.  REGULATING CRIME LABORATORIES 
A. The DNA Model 
As the above cases demonstrate, the problems with crime labs 
are systemic.  Regulation is the answer, but there is no need to start 
from scratch.  DNA labs are presently regulated and can serve as a 
model for all crime laboratory units.328 
In 1988, the FBI established the Technical Working Group on 
DNA Analysis Methods (“TWGDAM”) to develop quality control 
                                                                                                                                      
to Dr. Rau’s testimony, the government called Kerr, Boyd, and the other 
individuals at the meeting to testify that Dr. Rau’s account of the delay in 
releasing the solicitation was incorrect and that the delay was caused by budgetary 
issues. 
Id. at 232. 
 325. Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science:  Oxymoron?, 302 SCIENCE 1625, 
1625 (2003). 
 326. See Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing Forensic Science, ISSUES 
SCI. & TECH., Fall 2003, at 33, 34.  The authors note: 
The increased use of DNA analysis, which has undergone extensive validation, has 
thrown into relief the less firmly credentialed status of other forensic science 
identification techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite 
marks, and tool marks).  These have not undergone the type of extensive testing 
and verification that is the hallmark of science elsewhere. 
Id. 
 327. Congress appropriated $1,500,000 to the National Academies to create an 
independent Forensic Science Committee to study forensic science and issue a report.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 109-088, at 46 (2005).  A 
committee has recently been appointed. 
 328. See Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating Crime Laboratories:  The Impact of DNA 
Evidence, 13 J. L. & POL’Y 59 (2006) (discussing the history of crime labs in this country 
and the affect DNA profiling has had on them). 
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standards for DNA labs.329  Moreover, the National Academies issued 
two reports on the subject, noting the importance of certain practices:  
“No laboratory should let its results with a new DNA typing method 
be used in court, unless it has undergone . . . proficiency testing via 
blind trials.”330  Perhaps the most important development was the 
passage of the DNA Identification Act of 1994.331  It authorized the 
creation of a national database for the DNA profiles of convicted 
offenders as well as one for crime scene profiles:  the Combined DNA 
Index System (“CODIS”).  Bringing CODIS online was a 
monumental endeavor, and its successful operation required an 
effective quality assurance program.332  To effectuate this goal, the 
statute created a DNA Advisory Board (“DAB”) to assist in 
promulgating quality assurance standards.333  The Act also required 
proficiency testing for analysts in the FBI as well as those in labs 
participating in the national database or receiving federal funding.334  
DAB Standard 13 implements these requirements.335 
                                                          
 329. TWGDAM would later function under the statutorily-created DNA Advisory 
Board (“DAB”).  It was renamed Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods 
(“SWGDAM”) in 1999 and replaced the DAB when the latter expired.  See infra notes 
457–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Board’s composition). 
 330. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 55 
(1992) [hereinafter NRC I REPORT]; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 73 (1996) [hereinafter NRC II REPORT].  
The Council is the Academies’ research arm.  The FBI requested and funded both reports. 
 331. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14131–
14134) (West 2005). 
 332. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT, THE 
COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM ii (2001) [hereinafter 2001 I.G. REPORT] (“[T]he 
integrity of the data contained in CODIS is extremely important since the DNA matches 
provided by CODIS are frequently a key piece of evidence linking a suspect to a crime.”). 
 333. 42 U.S.C.A § 14131(a) (West 2005).  The legislation contained a sunset provision:  
DAB would expire after five years unless extended by the Director of the FBI.  The Board 
was extended through the sixth year to complete tasks and the Scientific Working Group 
on DNA Analysis Methods (“SWGDAM”) again took over responsibility.  NORAH 
RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 176, 180 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
 334. 42 U.S.C.A § 14132(b)(2) (West 2005) (requiring external proficiency testing for 
CODIS participation); id. § 1433(a)(1)(A) (requiring external proficiency testing for FBI 
examiners).  The statute was subsequently amended to require accreditation, which in turn 
mandates proficiency testing. 
 335. DNA Advisory Board, Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing 
Laboratories, Standard 13 (1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/ 
backissu/july2000/codis2b.htm (“Examiners and other personnel designated by the 
technical manager or leader who are actively engaged in DNA analysis shall undergo, at 
regular intervals of not to exceed 180 days, external proficiency testing in accordance with 
these proficiency standards.  Such external testing shall be an open proficiency testing 
program.”).  An open test is a non-blind test.  See RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 333, at 180 
(“The power of the DAB has been substantial, primarily because any agency requesting 
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DAB also promulgated standards governing (1) analytical 
protocols, (2) equipment calibration and maintenance procedures, 
and (3) administrative and technical reviews of test results.336  Among 
other requirements, labs must (a) review their procedures “annually 
or whenever substantial changes are made to protocol(s),” and (b) 
compare their results with available National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (“NIST”) reference materials or “standards traceable 
to NIST standards.”337  The DNA Act, however, suffered from one 
significant drawback:  it failed to require the accreditation of DNA 
labs,338 an omission rectified by the enactment of the “Justice for All 
Act of 2004.”339 
DNA cases, however, make up only a small portion of crime lab 
work—under four percent340—and only a few jurisdictions require 
accreditation of labs conducting other forensic examinations.341  Thus, 
the paradox:  the most scientifically sound procedure—DNA 
analysis—is the most extensively regulated, while many forensic 
techniques with questionable scientific pedigrees are completely 
unregulated. 
As a discipline, forensic science has been moving toward the 
accreditation of laboratories, the certification of examiners, and the 
standardization of procedures.342  These requirements should be 
                                                                                                                                      
federal development funds for forensic DNA testing or DNA databasing must 
demonstrate compliance with the standards set by this group.”). 
 336. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 9 (analytical procedures), 
Standard 10 (equipment calibration and maintenance), and Standard 12 (administrative 
and technical review of all case files). 
 337. Id., Standard 9.5. 
 338. In an attempt to address this deficiency, the preface to the DAB Standards 
recommended that “forensic laboratories performing DNA analysis seek such 
accreditation with all deliberate speed.”  Id., Preface.  Some states require accreditation of 
DNA labs.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2007) (requiring accreditation 
by ASCLD/LAB or any certifying body approved by ASCLD/LAB); see also supra note 
44 (discussing Indiana’s accreditation requirement). 
 339. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 1(a), 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).  The DNA Identification Act of 1994 was amended to 
require accreditation “by a nonprofit professional association of persons actively involved 
in forensic science that is nationally recognized within the forensic science community” 
within two years and to “undergo external audits, not less than once every 2 years, that 
demonstrate compliance with standards established by the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.”  Pub. L. No. 103-322, 118 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 14132(b)(2) (West 2005)). 
 340. See Jan S. Bashinski & Joseph L. Peterson, Forensic Sciences, in LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT:  POLICE MANAGEMENT 559, 562 (William Geller & Darrel Stephens eds., 
4th ed. 2003) (“[R]equests for serology/DNA, arson, trace evidence, and questioned 
document cases represent only a small fraction (3.4 percent) of the cases . . . .”). 
 341. See infra notes 353–56 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 577–78. 
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mandatory, not permissive.  Self-regulation is a lofty ideal but not 
nearly enough to ensure the integrity of a crime laboratory’s work 
product.343  An effective quality assurance program requires written 
procedures and a designated professional who is specifically 
responsible for the implementation of the program, as the DAB 
standards mandate for DNA analysis.344  An enforcement mechanism, 
such as accreditation, also needs to be in place. 
B. Accreditation of Crime Laboratories 
Citing clinical laboratories, which are regulated under the 
Clinical Laboratory Improvements Act of 1988,345 commentators have 
argued that crime laboratories should also be regulated.346  Currently, 
ASCLD/LAB operates an accreditation program for public and 
private crime laboratories.347  Requirements include ensuring the 
integrity of evidence, adhering to valid and generally accepted 
procedures, employing qualified examiners, and operating quality 
                                                          
 343. See Stacey, supra note 30, at 717 (“Many agencies are slow to [report erroneous 
identifications] or refuse to admit that errors have occurred.”). 
 344. See generally DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 3 (1998) (requiring 
a quality assurance program). 
 345. Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 263a 
(2004)). 
 346. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science:  The Need for Regulation, 4 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 109, 191 (1991) (“Current regulation of clinical labs indicates that a 
regulatory system can improve crime laboratories.”); Lander, supra note 1, 505 (“At 
present, forensic science is virtually unregulated—with the paradoxical result that clinical 
laboratories must meet higher standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than 
forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Science, 
and the Challenges of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, 1011 
(1998) (“Accreditation of laboratories presenting research in courts should provide a 
minimum standard for gauging the credibility of the research and testimony offered.”); see 
also Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 16 (“There is a model for improvement.  The 1988 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act provided accountability for laboratories that 
perform medical tests.  A mistake in health tests can have dire results—not only for the 
patient, but also for the lab, which risks losing accreditation.”). 
 347. Established in 1981, ASCLD/LAB accredits labs for a five-year period.  See AM. 
SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS., LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., PROFICIENCY REVIEW 
PROGRAM 2 (2006), http://www.ascld-lab.org/legacy/pdf/alpd1002.pdf.  ASCLAD/LAB 
has been criticized for being too close to the labs it accredits.  See Arvizu, supra note 32, at 
20–21 (“The ASCLD/LAB is essentially a trade organization of crime laboratory 
directors.  The membership of the ASCLD/LAB delegate assembly consists solely of the 
laboratory directors of ASCLD accredited laboratories.”); Possley et al., supra note 2 
(quoting former Cook County prosecutor and Republican state representative James 
Durkin) (“ ‘I believe they are more of a fraternal organization than an authoritative 
scientific body.’ ”).  This criticism is overblown.  ASCLD/LAB has been one of the most 
effective reform mechanisms in forensic science over the last decade by operating a 
voluntary accreditation program, by investigating the Zain fiasco in West Virginia, and by 
issuing a critical report in the Earl Washington case in Virginia.  See supra notes 54 (Zain 
inquiry) and 217 (Washington case). 
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assurance programs—i.e., proficiency testing, technical reviews, 
audits, and corrective action procedures.348  Over 240 laboratories 
have been accredited, and judicial opinions are approvingly citing 
these accreditation standards in their admissibility decisions.349  Only 
ten percent of the laboratories that apply satisfy these standards on 
the first inspection.350  In addition, Forensic Quality Services accredits 
laboratories, including those conducting DNA profiling, according to 
standards defined by the International Organization for 
Standardization (“ISO”).351  The National Association of Medical 
Examiners (“NAME”) runs an accreditation program for Coroners 
and Medical Examiner Offices, and the American Board of Forensic 
Toxicology accredits toxicology laboratories.352 
These programs are all voluntary, however, and many 
laboratories remain unaccredited.  Currently, only New York,353 
Oklahoma,354 and Texas355 require all their crime labs to be 
accredited; the California statute covers only DNA labs.356  In 2002, 
the President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
observed: 
Unfortunately, while the ASCLD/LAB program has been 
successful in accrediting over 200 laboratories, a large number 
                                                          
 348. Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 578. 
 349. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]he [DNA] lab was 
accredited by the American Society of Crime Lab Directors in 1990.  Furthermore, the lab 
runs its tests under controlled conditions, follows specific protocols, and conducts quality 
testing on the kits and the analysts.”). 
 350. See Kenneth E. Melson, Crime Laboratory Accreditation:  The Assurance of 
Quality in the Forensic Sciences, in A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE STATE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6–7 (2003) (“[L]ess than ten percent of applicant laboratories achieve 
accreditation following the initial inspection.”). 
 351. See Forensic Quality Services, http://www.forquality.org/ (last visited Nov. 29, 
2007) (explaining accreditation procedures).  Forensic Quality Services is also one of six 
accreditation bodies recognized by the National Cooperation for Laboratory 
Accreditation.  National Cooperation for Laboratory Accreditation, Accreditation Bodies 
Recognized by NACLA, http://nacla.net/recognized.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).  
 352. See National Association of Medical Examiners, http://www.thename.org/ (follow 
“About NAME” hyperlink; then follow “General Information” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2007); American Board of Forensic Toxicology, http://www.abft.org (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2007).   
 353. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995b (McKinney Supp. 2007) (requiring accreditation by state 
Forensic Science Commission). 
 354. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West Supp. 2007) (generally requiring 
accreditation by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory 
Accreditation Board or the American Board of Forensic Toxicology). 
 355. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon Supp. 2006–2007) (requiring 
accreditation by the Department of Public Safety). 
 356. CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2007) (requiring accreditation by 
ASCLD/LAB or any certifying body approved by ASCLD/LAB). 
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of forensic laboratories in the U.S. remain unaccredited by any 
agency. . . .  The same dichotomy exists in certification 
programs for the practicing forensic scientist, even though 
forensic certification boards for all the major disciplines have 
been in existence for over a decade.  Why have forensic 
laboratories and individuals been so reluctant to become 
accredited or certified?357 
As the National Academies 1992 DNA Report commented, 
“[v]oluntary accreditation programs are not enough.  Because 
professional organizations, such as ASCLD-LAB, lack regulatory 
authority, forensic laboratories could avoid accreditation and still 
offer DNA typing evidence in criminal proceedings.”358  As noted 
above, the Justice for All Act of 2004 now mandates accreditation for 
DNA labs participating in the national database.359  An accreditation 
requirement should apply to the entire crime laboratory, not only to 
DNA units. 
C. Quality Assurance 
The key to laboratory performance is quality assurance.  Yet, 
“[s]omewhat surprisingly, crime labs are not generally subject to 
mandatory quality-assurance standards imposed by federal or state 
law.”360  Quality assurance consists of several activities:  proficiency 
testing, laboratory audits, technical reviews, and corrective action 
procedures. 
1.  Proficiency Testing 
Proficiency testing in the forensic sciences dates back thirty 
years.  In 1978, the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program, 
sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(“LEAA”), reported the results of the first proficiency tests.361  Over 
200 crime laboratories participated in this program, which involved 
such common forensic examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and 
trace evidence analyses.362  Seventy-one percent of the crime 
                                                          
 357. Graham R. Jones, President’s Editorial—The Changing Practice of Forensic 
Science, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 437, 438 (2002). 
 358. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 106. 
 359. See supra note 339. 
 360. Bales, supra note 236, at 54; see also Joseph L. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in 
THINKING ABOUT POLICE 184, 196 (Carl B. Klockars ed., 1983) (“Crime laboratories are 
unique among publicly supported scientific operations in that few participate in external 
quality assurance programs.”). 
 361. See JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING 
RESEARCH PROGRAM (1978). 
 362. Id. at 251. 
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laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test, 
51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred in a soil 
examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications.363  
The report concluded:  “A wide range of proficiency levels among the 
nation’s laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious 
difficulties for the laboratories . . . .”364  Thus, although some 
laboratories performed exceptionally well, the performances of others 
were disturbing:  “65 percent of the laboratories had 80 percent or 
more of their results fall into the acceptable category.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less than 50 
percent of their responses considered acceptable.”365  Similarly, 
certain types of examinations caused few problems, whereas others 
produced very high rates of “unacceptable proficiency.”366  
Unacceptable proficiency was most often attributed to (1) 
misinterpretation of test results due to carelessness or inexperience, 
(2) failure to employ adequate or appropriate methodology, (3) 
mislabeling or contamination of primary standards, and (4) 
inadequate databases or standard spectra.367 
Given these results, one would have expected the 
implementation of fairly extensive reforms.  However, “[t]he startling 
conclusions from that research led to some efforts to improve 
conditions in the laboratories, but these encounter[ed] institutional 
inertia against reform.”368  In sum, widespread reform failed to 
materialize. 
                                                          
 363. Id. at 251 tbl.89.  One blood test had only 3.8% unacceptable results.  Id. 
 364. Id. at 3. 
 365. Peterson, supra note 360, at 195. 
 366. See id. at 188–91.  The number of laboratories responding ranged from a low of 65 
to a high of 205.  Id. at 194.  An unacceptable response did not necessarily mean an 
incorrect one.  Id. at 191.  Other reasons for an unacceptable designation included a 
correct response for the wrong reason, an unsupported, inclusive response, multiple 
responses, and incomplete responses.  Id. 
 367. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 361, at 258.  Professor Peterson, one of the report’s 
authors, later commented:  “In spite of being a firm advocate of forensic science, I must 
acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are not performing 
routine tests competently, as shown by our proficiency testing.”  Symposium on Science 
and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1983). 
 368. Symposium, supra note 367, at 645 (remarks of Professor Joseph L. Peterson).  
For a more detailed discussion of proficiency testing, see Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and 
Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 772, 775–78 (1989) 
(reviewing proficiency testing results and stating, “[p]erhaps the major lessons to be drawn 
from this are that errors are indeed made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory 
variation”). 
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The Forensic Science Foundation was the next organization to 
conduct proficiency testing—from 1978 to 1991.369  The results of 
these tests confirmed the findings of the LEAA study—that forensic 
labs show unacceptably high error rates in certain fields.  Several 
types of examinations caused concern:  fiber, paint, glass, and body 
fluid comparisons resulted in incorrect results in more than ten 
percent of the cases.370  A review of five handwriting comparison 
proficiency tests in 1987 showed that, at best, “[d]ocument examiners 
were correct 57% of the time and incorrect 43% of the time.”371  This 
program has continued:  “By 2000, more than 400 laboratories 
worldwide were participating in the program.  Although the majority 
of laboratories have been found to produce correct results, the 
program has revealed errors stemming from inadequate standard 
reference materials, inexperienced examiners, inappropriate tests, or 
misinterpretation of otherwise good data.”372 
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 required proficiency testing 
for DNA examiners in the FBI Laboratory and for those in 
laboratories participating in the national DNA database or receiving 
federal funding.373  In addition, a laboratory voluntarily accredited by 
ASCLD/LAB must engage in a documented program of proficiency 
testing that measures the capability of its examiners and the reliability 
                                                          
 369. See generally Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory 
Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–1991.  I:  Identification and Classification of Physical 
Evidence, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 994 (1995) [hereinafter Peterson & Markham, Crime Labs 
I] (finding that labs had a high degree of success in identifying drugs and typing 
bloodstains; had moderate success in identifying flammables, explosives, and fibers; and 
had trouble with animal hair identifications and human hair body location); Joseph L. 
Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–
1991.  II:  Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 (1995) 
[hereinafter Peterson & Markham, Crime Labs II] (finding that labs performed best in 
determining the origin of finger and palm prints, firearms identifications, and footwear; 
had moderate success in determining the source of bloodstains, questioned documents, 
tool marks, and hair; and the least success in identifying paint, glass, fibers, and body fluid 
mixtures). 
 370. Peterson & Markham, Crime Labs II, supra note 369, at 1028. 
 371. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational 
Knowledge:  The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
731, 748 (1989). 
 372. Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 579. 
 373. 42 U.S.C.A § 14132(b)(2) (West 2005) (mandating external proficiency testing for 
CODIS participation); id. § 14133(a)(1)(A) (mandating the same for FBI DNA analysts) 
(2004).  As noted earlier, DAB Standard 13 implements this requirement.  See supra note 
335 and accompanying text.  The 1996 National Academies DNA report also 
recommended proficiency testing.  NRC II REPORT, supra note 330, at 88 
(“Recommendation 3.2:  Laboratories should participate regularly in proficiency tests, and 
the results should be available for court proceedings.”). 
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of its analytical results.374  All forensic disciplines should be 
legislatively obliged to participate in meaningful proficiency testing.375 
There are several types of proficiency testing:  internal or 
external, and blind or non-blind.  External blind testing is by far the 
best.  The DNA Act authorized a study of the feasibility of blind 
proficiency testing; that study raised questions about the cost and 
practicability of this type of examination, as well as its effectiveness 
when compared to other methods of quality assurance, such as 
accreditation and more stringent external case audits.376 
In addition, the rigor of some voluntary proficiency tests is 
suspect.377  For example, a fingerprint examiner from New Scotland 
Yard testified in one case that the FBI proficiency tests were 
deficient:  “It’s not testing their ability.  It doesn’t test their expertise.  
I mean I’ve set these tests to trainees and advanced technicians.  And 
                                                          
 374. Melson, supra note 350, at 8–9.  The proficiency tests must be conducted by 
external providers, where available.  Id. at 9.  Laboratories are also encouraged to conduct 
proficiency testing using blind tests prepared internally or externally and submitted as 
normal casework evidence or by re-examination by another examiner on completed 
casework.  Id. at 9–10. 
 375. See Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 579 (“Laboratory proficiency cannot 
be assumed.  It must be positively demonstrated.”); see also THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, 
supra note 166, at 37–38 (reporting that the examiner “failed her competency test after, 
among other things, she indicated the presence of PCP in both blood samples where it was 
not present, did not detect the morphine presence in the first blood sample, and did not 
detect either substances in the second blood sample”). 
 376. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency 
Testing. I. Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 21 (2003).  That study 
concluded: 
1.  The accreditation system and associated quality assurance guidelines of the 
DNA Advisory Board need to be given the opportunity to take hold. 
2.  It is recommended that the DNA Advisory Board generate guidelines for 
more stringent external case audits for use by ASCLD-LAB, or another 
relevant accrediting body, as part of the accreditation process.  The external 
case audits should be conducted regularly and serve as a measure of how well 
accreditation and its associated requirements are working in a quality 
assurance context. 
3.  In the extreme, blind proficiency testing is possible, but fraught with problems 
(including costs), and it is recommended that a blind proficiency testing 
program be deferred for now until it is more clear how well implementation of 
the first two recommendations are serving the same purposes as blind 
proficiency testing. 
Id. at 30. 
 377. See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 208 (N.D. Ohio  1991) (“[T]he 
F.B.I. program of [DNA] proficiency testing has serious deficiencies, even without 
consideration of the troubling hint in the record of an impulse at one point to destroy 
some of the small amount of test data that had been accumulated earlier.”), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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if I gave my experts these tests, they’d fall about laughing.”378  The 
district court agreed, noting that “the FBI examiners got very high 
proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . .  [O]n the 
present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less 
demanding than they should be.”379 The FBI’s own report 
acknowledged this shortcoming.380  Similarly, in a trial involving 
handwriting comparisons, the court wrote: 
There were aspects of Mr. Cawley’s testimony that undermined 
his credibility.  Mr. Cawley testified that he achieved a 100% 
passage rate on the proficiency tests that he took and that all of 
his peers always passed their proficiency tests.  Mr. Cawley said 
that his peers always agreed with each others’ results and 
always got it right.  Peer review in such a “Lake Woebegone” 
environment is not meaningful.381 
If proficiency programs are not rigorous, they provide only an 
illusion of reliability.  Indeed, by bestowing an undeserved 
imprimatur, they are affirmatively misleading. 
2.  Laboratory Audits 
Inspections or audits are another significant quality assurance 
mechanism.  They “may range from internal peer review (review of 
one laboratory section by another or review of the laboratory unit by 
the audit unit of the department) to a full-scale inspection by a team 
of external scientists such as the ASCLD/LAB accreditation 
inspectors.”382 
                                                          
 378. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 379. Id. at 565; see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that are 
far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.”); Mnookin, supra note 313 
(“There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill.  Those tests that 
exist are not routinely used and are substandard.”). 
 380. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 381. United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D.W. Va. 2002); see also Crisp, 
324 F.3d at 279 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough the government’s expert here 
testified to his success on proficiency tests, the government provides no reason for us to 
believe that these tests are realistic assessments of an examiner’s ability . . . .  See J.A. 342 
(testimony of the government’s handwriting expert that he has always achieved a perfect 
score on proficiency tests) . . . .”). 
 382. Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 587; see also Arvizu, supra note 32, at 25 
(“[O]nly an on-site laboratory audit can provide a complete picture of a laboratory.  It is 
one thing to have acceptable written procedures for a laboratory’s activities.  It is quite 
another to comply with the procedures on a daily basis.”). 
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DAB standards mandate annual internal audits and biannual 
external audits for DNA labs.383  Yet, a 2001 I.G. Report found that 
the audit procedures for CODIS were defective.  A review of eight 
state and local laboratories “disclosed that four laboratories did not 
fully comply with the FBI’s quality assurance standards and national 
index requirements.”384  In addition, labs had entered unallowable or 
incomplete profiles into CODIS.  The problem stemmed from the fact 
that the audit did not review the actual DNA profiles, and labs could 
certify their own compliance instead of reporting audit results directly 
to the FBI.  Here, again, the experience with regulating DNA analysis 
provides a template.  The new federal legislation dictates that 
“external audits, not less than once every 2 years . . . [must] 
demonstrate compliance with standards established by the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”385 
As the Houston fiasco demonstrated, internal audits are often 
not rigorous.  That lab passed its internal audits with flying colors, 
only to be shut down following an external audit.386 
3.  Corrective Action Procedures 
DAB standards also require corrective action procedures 
“whenever proficiency-testing discrepancies and/or casework errors 
are detected.”387  The value of such a program is illustrated by a series 
of news articles on the Washington state DNA program.  Over a four-
year period, the lab documented “contamination or errors in twenty-
three of more than 5,000 DNA cases.”388  Because PCR-DNA is 
extremely sensitive, cross-contamination is always a concern.389  The 
                                                          
 383. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 15.1 (“The laboratory shall 
conduct audits annually in accordance with the standards outlined herein.”); id. Standard 
15.2 (“Once every two years, a second agency shall participate in the annual audit.”). 
 384. 2001 I.G. REPORT, supra note 332, at iii. 
 385. 42 U.S.C.A § 14132(b)(2)(B) (West 2005). 
 386. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 387. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 14.1. 
 388. See Barry K. Logan, Crime Lab Committed to Improvements, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 30, 2004, at B7.  Logan was the lab director. 
 389. See John E. Smialek et al., The Microscopic Slide:  A Potential DNA Reservoir, 
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 2000, at 18, 19.  Smialek notes: 
Contamination occurs when the evidence comes in contact with another 
individual’s body fluids through actions, such as sneezing, coughing, or 
touching. . . .  But, the PCR process cannot distinguish between DNA from a 
suspect and another source.  Therefore, any substantial contamination to the DNA 
material will result in a confusing result. 
Id. 
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reported deficiencies are troublesome,390 but the lack of any 
corrective action file would be far more worrisome.  In other words, 
this information may show that the system is working—mistakes are 
being reported, the first step toward remediation. 
D. Standardization of Technical Procedures 
Valid procedures, of course, are critical to ensure the accuracy of 
test results.  The 1997 I.G. Report recommended the development of 
written protocols for scientific procedures.391  According to the first 
National Academies Report, “[e]ach DNA typing procedure must be 
completely described in a detailed, written laboratory protocol.”392  
Current DAB standards require DNA analytical protocols, 
equipment calibration and maintenance procedures, and 
administrative and technical reviews of test results.393  They also 
prescribe developmental and internal validation.394  Further, all 
ASCLD/LAB-accredited laboratories must maintain written copies of 
appropriate technical procedures.  These protocols include 
descriptions of sample preparation methods, controls, standards, and 
calibration procedures, as well as a discussion of precautions, sources 
of possible error, and literature references.395 
                                                          
 390. See Teichroeb, Rare Look, supra note 23 (reporting that examiners “tainted tests 
with their own DNA in eight of the 23 cases” and that cross-contamination between cases 
occurred in three incidents and other mistakes included “throwing out evidence swabs to 
misreading results, fingering the wrong rape suspect”; the source of contamination in five 
other tests was unknown). 
 391. See 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27, Executive Summary, at pt. VII; see also 
supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 392. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 8.  The second report stated that 
“[l]aboratories should adhere to high quality standards . . . .”  NRC II REPORT, supra note 
330, at 88 (citing TWGDAM and DAB standards as examples in Recommendation 3.1). 
 393. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standards 9, 10 & 12. 
 394. Id. Standard 2(ff): (“Validation is a process by which a procedure is evaluated to 
determine its efficacy and reliability . . . .  Developmental validation is the acquisition of 
test data and the determination of conditions and limitations of a new or novel DNA 
methodology . . . ; (2) Internal validation is the accumulation of test data within the 
laboratory to demonstrate that established methods and procedures perform as expected 
in the laboratory.”).  SWGDAM promulgated revised validation guidelines in 2003.  See 
Revised Validation Guidelines, FORENSIC SCI. COMM., July 2004, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ 
lab/fsc/backissu/july2004/standards/2004_03_standards02.htm. 
 395. Melson, supra note 350, at 8.  During accreditation audits, a representative 
number of laboratory reports are subjected to review to ensure that the conclusions of 
examiners are reasonable and within the constraints of scientific knowledge.  Id. at 9.  This 
technical review assures that laboratory protocols are being utilized.  Id. at 8.  All new 
technical procedures must be scientifically validated before being used in casework.  Id.  
See generally AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS., supra note 347 (explaining accreditation 
program). 
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Based on the DNA experience with TWGDAM, established by 
the FBI in 1988, comparable groups were set up in fingerprints, 
controlled substances, trace evidence or materials analysis, 
questioned documents, fire and explosives, imaging technology, 
digital evidence, and firearms examination.396  Moreover, the 
American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) has 
promulgated standards in some forensic areas.397 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court cited the “existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation” as a 
relevant factor in assessing the reliability of expert testimony.398  The 
adoption and public promulgation of written laboratory protocols 
would seem to be required by this factor.  In fact, any laboratory 
without such protocols cannot be called a “scientific” laboratory. 
E. Problem Issues 
Several vexing issues concerning lab procedures surface on a 
recurring basis.  This section addresses four of those issues. 
1.  Cognitive Bias 
Commentators have identified both motivational and cognitive 
bias as a concern in the forensic setting.399  As one commentator 
noted:  “To the extent that we are aware of our vulnerability to bias, 
we may be able to control it.  In fact, a feature of good scientific 
practice is the institution of processes—such as blind testing, the use 
of precise measurements, standardized procedures, statistical 
analysis—that control for bias.”400  Similarly, the 1996 National 
Academies DNA Report notes, “[l]aboratory procedures should be 
                                                          
 396. See Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 580. 
 397. See generally John J. Lentini, ASTM Standards for Forensic Sciences, 40 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 146 (1995) (explaining the work of Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences); 
Eric Stauffer & John J. Lentini, ASTM Standards for Fire Debris Analysis:  A Review, 132 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 63 (2003), available at http://www.atslab.com/fire/PDF/ASTM 
StandardsForFireDebrisAnalysis.pdf (discussing updated standards for arson 
investigations). 
 398. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 399. See infra notes 449–53 and accompanying text (discussing motivational bias); see 
also Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter, Contaminated Evidence, 304 SCIENCE 
959, 959 (2004) (“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly unwilling to confront and control 
the problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome through sheer force of will and good 
intentions.”). 
 400. MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (2001). 
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designed with safeguards to detect bias and to identify cases of true 
ambiguity.  Potential ambiguities should be documented.”401 
External information provided to lab analysts will often taint 
their conclusions.  For example, “[Professor] Peter DeForest has 
described investigators who responded to inconclusive results by 
saying to forensic examiners:  ‘Would it help if I told you we know 
he’s the guy who did it?’ ”402  Joyce Gilchrist often received 
detectives’ views on suspects before she conducted her 
examinations.403  Confirmation bias also arose in the misidentification 
of fingerprints of Brian Mayfield in the Madrid train bombing 
investigation404 and other FBI investigations.405 
As a result of the Mayfield case, several British researchers 
devised an experiment to test whether external influences can affect 
the identification process.406  In particular, they were concerned with 
confirmation bias similar to that which occurred in the Mayfield 
misidentification.  Fingerprint examiners who were unfamiliar with 
the Mayfield prints were asked by colleagues to compare a crime 
scene and suspect print:  “They were told that the pair of prints was 
the one that was erroneously matched by the FBI as the Madrid 
bomber, thus creating an extraneous context that the prints were a 
non-match.”407  The participants were then instructed to ignore this 
information.408  The prints, in fact, were from cases that each of the 
participants had previously matched.409  Of the five examiners, only 
                                                          
 401. NRC II REPORT, supra note 330, at 85.  The Report adds:  “Bias in forensic 
science usually leads to sins of omission rather than commission.  Possibly exculpating 
evidence might be ignored or rejected.”  Id. at 84–85. 
 402. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects 
in Forensic Science:  Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
39 (2002) (quoting Peter DeForest, Address at 2d International Conference on Forensic 
Document Examination (June 14–18, 1999) (notes of Michael Saks, who was present)). 
 403. See FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 91 (“When Cook and other homicide detectives 
gave Gilchrist hair samples from a suspect, they would often let her know that this was the 
person they wanted to arrest.”). 
 404. See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text. 
 405. See Bales, supra note 236, at 52 (“[The 1997 I.G. Report] concluded that an 
examiner from the lab’s explosives unit had erred by purporting to identify the particular 
explosives used in the [1993] World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings.  The 
error stemmed from the examiner’s reliance on information that was tied to suspects but 
not relevant to his scientific analysis.”). 
 406. Itiel E. Dror et el., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making 
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–76 (2006) (explaining the 
experiment’s methodology). 
 407. Id. at 76. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. at 75.  
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one still judged the print to be a match.410  The other four changed 
their opinions; three directly contradicted their prior identifications, 
and the fourth concluded that there was insufficient data to reach a 
definite conclusion.411  “This is striking given that all five experts had 
seen the identical fingerprints previously and all had decided that the 
prints were a sound and definite match.”412 
In sum, information from an investigation should not be given to 
the analyst interpreting the results—i.e., the examiner should 
generally be “blind” to the case’s circumstances and other evidence.413 
2.  Contemporaneous Recordation 
The lack of bench notes is often cited in the lab scandals.  The 
West Virginia,414 Chicago,415 Houston,416 and FBI explosive unit417 
investigations all found inadequate documentation in forensic case 
files.418  Moreover, in one Supreme Court case, Delaware v. 
                                                          
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id.  The authors of the study concluded: 
Our study shows that it is possible to alter identification decisions on the same 
fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a different context.  This does not imply that 
fingerprint and other forensic identifications are not a science, but it does highlight 
problems of subjectivity, interpretation, and other psychological and cognitive 
elements that interact and may distort any scientific inquiries. 
Id.  at 77. 
 413. One crime lab examiner, “who has worked in the crime lab system since 1998, said 
she tried not to be swayed by detectives’ belief that they had a strong suspect.  ‘We’re all 
human,’ she said.  ‘I tried not to let it influence me.  But I can’t say it never does.’ ”  
Teichroeb, Rare Look, supra note 23. 
 414. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 415. Letter from Sensabaugh, supra note 156 (“Overall, the documentation of the lab 
work as described in the three pages of lab notes is inadequate and incomplete.  
Moreover, the formal lab reports describe results of testing for which there is no record in 
the lab notes.  In short, the documentation in this case falls short of accepted scientific 
standards.”). 
 416. THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 166, at 28 (“Among other problems it 
identified, the 2002 DPS audit found that no such written procedures [for case notes and 
lab reports] existed and identified numerous deficiencies in the documentation contained 
in the lab reports.”). 
 417. See 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27 (recommending the preparation of adequate 
case files to support reports); Bales, supra note 236, at 57 (noting that one FBI examiner 
“testified that he had performed certain tests that were not described in his notes”). 
 418. See Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It is an 
insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted from which absolutely 
no notes or records survive. . . .  A basic principle of scientific testing is that careful records 
of test procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained.  A scientific test without 
an accompanying report of the testing environment, number of trials, raw results and 
analyzed data is in reality no test at all.”). 
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Fensterer,419 an FBI analyst testified that he could not remember 
which of three methods he had used to determine that hair found at a 
murder scene had been forcibly removed.420  He apparently neglected 
to record this critical information. 
DAB Standards require laboratories to adopt and follow written 
procedures for taking and maintaining case notes to support the 
conclusions drawn in laboratory reports:  in particular, a case record 
containing all documentation generated by examiners relating to case 
analysis is standard practice.421  Unfortunately, the standards do not 
specify that the notes be recorded contemporaneously with the 
examination, a deficiency noted in the 2004 I.G. Report.422 
3.  Laboratory Reports 
Most pretrial discovery statutes provide for the disclosure of 
scientific reports.423  For example, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 makes the “results or reports of any physical or mental 
examination and of any scientific test or experiment” discoverable.424  
Yet, these rules contain no requirement regarding the content of a 
laboratory report.425  The Journal of Forensic Sciences, the official 
publication of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, 
published a symposium on the ethical responsibilities of forensic 
scientists in 1989.426  One article discussed a number of laboratory 
                                                          
 419. 474 U.S. 15 (1985). 
 420. Id. at 17.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to find a confrontation 
violation in this situation.  Id. at 20.  On remand, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held the opinion inadmissible, but on evidentiary, rather than constitutional, grounds.  
Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Del. 1986).  According to the court:  “While a 
witness’s mere lack of memory as to a particular fact may go only to the weight of that 
evidence, an expert witness’s inability to establish a sufficient basis for his opinion clearly 
renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705.”  Id. at 1109–10. 
 421. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 11.1. 
 422. 2004 I.G. REPORT, supra note 28, at 107.  The report commented:  
“[C]ontemporaneous documentation is important to ensure that the case file accurately 
reflects the work performed on each evidence item that is tested. . . .  [S]taff members may 
be unduly influenced by protocol requirements when relying on memory, and document 
what they know should have occurred when their recollection is vague.”  Id. 
 423. See UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 421(a) (Approved Draft 1974) (specifying that “expert 
reports” are discoverable); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  DISCOVERY AND 
TRIAL BY JURY, Standard 11-2.1(a)(iv) (3d ed. 1996). 
 424. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F). 
 425. As a result, the reports are often cryptic or confusing.  See Bales, supra note 236, 
at 56 (“Reports of forensic examinations are sometimes terse to the point of being 
indecipherable.”); FINAL HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 170, at 21 (“The awkwardly-
stated conclusions appearing in many of the Crime Lab’s DNA reports are difficult to 
understand.”). 
 426. Joseph L. Peterson, Symposium:  Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Sciences, 34 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 717–93 (1989). 
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reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing 
minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition 
for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an 
interpretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required 
it can be provided from the witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some 
significant point from a report to trap an unsuspecting cross-
examiner.”427  Fred Zain,428 Joyce Gilchrist,429 and Pam Fish,430 among 
others, omitted critical information from their reports.  These 
practices could be curbed, if not eliminated, by requiring 
comprehensive laboratory reports. 
Comprehensive lab reports are simply good science.431  Both 
DAB432 and ASCLD/LAB433 have standards governing laboratory 
reports.  By ensuring that the examiner has followed the prescribed 
procedure and by permitting external review, lab reports can function 
as a quality control mechanism.  In particular, the report should 
contain an express statement of the limitations of the technique.434 
                                                          
 427. Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist:  Exploring 
the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989).  Lucas was the Director of the Centre of 
Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Toronto, Ontario. 
 428. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 429. See supra notes 70–117 and accompanying text. 
 430. See supra notes 150–59 and accompanying text. 
 431. One scientist has observed that a crime lab report at a minimum should include: 
(a) a description of the analytical techniques used in the test requested by the 
government or other party, (b) the quantitative or qualitative results with any 
appropriate qualifications concerning the degree of certainty surrounding them, 
and (c) an explanation of any necessary presumptions or inferences that were 
needed to reach the conclusions. 
Professor Anna Harrison, Mount Holyoke College, Symposium on Science, supra note 
367, at 632. 
 432. See DNA Advisory Board, supra note 335, Standard 11.1.2 (requiring reports to 
include (1) a case identifier, (2) a “description of evidence examined,” (3) “[a] description 
of the methodology,” (4) the locus tested, (5) the “[r]esults and/or conclusions,” (6) “[a]n 
interpretative statement (either quantitative or qualitative),” (7) the “[d]ate issued,” (8) 
the “[d]isposition of evidence,” and (9) “[a] signature and title, or equivalent 
identification, of the person(s) accepting responsibility of the content of the report”). 
 433. See ASCLD Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management Practices, 14 CRIME 
LABORATORY DIG. 39, 43 (1987) (“The documentation should be such that a 
knowledgeable analyst or supervisor, in the absence of the primary analyst, would be able 
to evaluate and interpret the data.”  Competent laboratory reports must include (1) an 
“accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes,” (2) “interpretive 
information as well as examination results wherever possible,” and (3) identification of 
“the analyst(s) and, if appropriate, the testing methodology.”). 
 434. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 254, at 110 (“The conclusions in 
laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations of compositional analysis 
of bullet lead evidence.  Moreover, a section of the laboratory report translating the 
technical conclusions into language that a jury could understand would greatly facilitate 
the proper use of this evidence in the criminal justice system.”). 
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Comprehensive reports also promote good legal policy.435  
Because they are discoverable, they assist attorneys in preparing for 
trial and in rendering effective representation.  Further, determining 
whether defense counsel should seek the appointment of a defense 
expert often requires a preliminary assessment by an expert.  An 
expert might be willing to review a report but not want to become 
further involved in a case without compensation.  Unless the report is 
comprehensive, such a review may be worthless. 
4.  Testifying Beyond the Report 
Experts should generally not testify beyond the scope of the 
report without issuing a supplemental report.  Troedel v. 
Wainwright,436 a capital murder case, illustrates the problem.  In that 
case, a report of a gunshot residue test based on neutron activation 
analysis concluded that swabs “from the hands of Troedel and 
Hawkins contained antimony and barium [primer residues] in 
amounts typically found on the hands of a person who has discharged 
a firearm or has had his hands in close proximity to a discharging 
firearm.”437  An FBI expert testified in accordance with this report at 
Hawkins’ trial but enhanced his testimony at Troedel’s trial, when he 
testified that “Troedel had fired the murder weapon.”438  In contrast, 
during federal habeas proceedings, the same expert testified in a 
deposition that “he could not, from the results of his tests, determine 
or say to a scientific certainty who had fired the murder weapon” and 
that “the differences in the amount of barium and antimony on the 
hands of Troedel and Hawkins were basically insignificant.”439  The 
district court found the trial testimony, “at the very least,” 
misleading.440  In granting habeas relief, the court wrote: 
[T]he Court concludes that the opinion Troedel had fired the 
weapon was known by the prosecution not to be based on the 
results of the neutron activation analysis tests, or on any 
scientific certainty or even probability.  Thus, the subject 
                                                          
 435. The Canadian investigation into the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin made 
the following recommendation:  “The Centre of Forensic Science should establish a 
written policy on the form and content of reports issued by its analysts. . . .  In addition to 
other essential components, these reports must contain the conclusions drawn from the 
forensic testing and the limitations to be placed upon those conclusions.”  1 KAUFMAN, 
supra note 138, Recommendation 7, at 331. 
 436. 667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 437. Id. at 1458. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. at 1459. 
 440. Id. 
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testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the 
State knowing it to be misleading.441 
In addition to other functions, comprehensive reports afford 
substantial protection to experts from overreaching by attorneys.  In 
Troedel, the expert claimed that the prosecutor had “pushed” him to 
enhance his testimony, a claim the prosecutor substantiated.442  The 
issue also surfaced in Joyce Gilchrist’s cases.443  Experts are often 
pressured by attorneys to “push the envelope”—not a surprising 
occurrence in an adversarial system.444  ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards state that a 
prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect 
the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate 
the formation of the expert’s opinion on the subject. . . .  [T]he 
prosecutor should explain to the expert his or her role in the 
trial as an impartial expert . . . .445 
The commentary to this standard elaborates: 
Statements made by physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts 
about their experiences as witnesses in criminal cases indicate 
the need for circumspection on the part of prosecutors who 
engage experts.  Nothing should be done by a prosecutor to cast 
                                                          
 441. Id. at 1459–60. 
 442. Id. at 1459 (“[A]s Mr. Riley [the expert] candidly admitted in his deposition, he 
was ‘pushed’ further in his analysis at Troedel’s trial than at Hawkins’ trial. . . .  [At the] 
evidentiary hearing held before this Court, one of the prosecutors testified that, at 
Troedel’s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his opinion which was contained in his 
written report, the prosecutor pushed to ‘see if more could have been gotten out of this 
witness.’ ”). 
 443. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (“[W]e are 
greatly disturbed by the implications that the Oklahoma County District Attorney’s Office 
may have placed undue pressure upon Ms. Gilchrist to give a so-called expert opinion, 
which was beyond scientific capabilities.”); id. at 1219 (quoting a prepared statement from 
the Board of Directors of the Southwestern Association of Forensic Scientists, Inc., that 
“in our system of jurisprudence, undue pressure can be placed upon the forensic scientist 
to offer personal opinions beyond the scope of scientific capabilities’ ”) (citation omitted); 
see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 258 (1988) (“District Court 
further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an expert witness 
during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave testimony adverse to the 
Government.”). 
 444. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 5, at 31 (quoting Dr. Robert Shaler, former head 
of N.Y.C. Medical Examiner’s DNA unit) (“Most attorneys like to let you know what 
their opinions of the facts of the case are—irrespective of the scientific conclusions.”). 
 445. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.3(a) (3d ed. 1993).  A comparable standard applies to 
defense counsel.  See id., Standard 404.4(a). 
GIANNELLI.FPP 12/17/2007  2:47:57 PM 
2007] CRIME LAB REGULATION 227 
 
suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the expert 
color an opinion to favor the interests of the prosecutor.446 
F. Certification of Examiners 
A number of organizations offer examiner certification 
programs.447  Some certifying organizations, however, appear to lack 
stringent requirements.  Instead, they issue what are reported to be 
“checkbook credentials.”448  Rigorous certification standards should 
be instituted for examiners in order to ensure competence.  
Demanding written examinations, proficiency testing, continuing 
education, recertification procedures, an ethical code, and effective 
disciplinary procedures should form the basis of such a program. 
G. Forensic Science Commissions 
Commentators have argued for the establishment of crime 
laboratories that are independent of the police in order to minimize 
police pressure that may bias lab results.449  In 2002, the Illinois 
                                                          
 446. Id. at 59. 
 447. For example, the American Board of Criminalistics has had such a program since 
1993.  It is a two-step process.  The first tier requires an examination on general 
knowledge, and the second involves specialty areas, which include molecular biology, drug 
analysis, fire debris, and trace evidence.  Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 577.  To 
maintain certification, ongoing proficiency testing is required.  Id.  The International 
Association of Identification established a program for latent print examiners in 1977.  Id.  
The Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners established one in 2001.  Id.  The 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences has set up a number of national boards in the 
field of pathology, toxicology, anthropology, odontology, and questioned documents.  See 
id.; RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 333, at 175.  Of course, these programs are valuable only 
to the extent they apply exacting standards. 
 448. See Mark Hansen, Expertise to Go, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 44, 45; Elizabeth 
MacDonald, The Making of an Expert Witness:  It’s in the Credentials, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 
1999, at B1. 
 449. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 49, at 469–73; Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases:  Some Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 
(1993) (“[Crime labs] may be so imbued with a pro-police bias that they are willing to 
circumvent true scientific investigation methods for the sake of ‘making their point.’ ”); 
Symposium on Science, supra note 367, at 642 (statement of Joseph L. Peterson) (“[T]he 
police agency controls the formal and informal system of rewards and sanctions for the 
laboratory examiners.  Many of these laboratories make their services available only to 
law enforcement agencies.  All of these factors raise a legitimate issue regarding the 
objectivity of laboratory personnel.”); James E. Starrs, The Seamy Side of Forensic 
Science:  The Mephitic Stain of Fred Salem Zain, SCI. SLEUTHING REV., Winter 1993, at 1, 
8 (“The inbred bias of crime laboratories affiliated with law enforcement agencies must be 
breached.”); see also Regina v. Ward, 96 Crim. App. 1, 51 (A.C. 1993) (appeal taken from 
England) (U.K.) (“Forensic scientists may become partisan.  The very fact that the police 
seek their assistance may create a relationship between the police and the forensic 
scientists. . . .  Forensic scientists employed by the government may come to see their 
function as helping the police.  They may lose their objectivity.”); Ellis, supra note 2 
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Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment proposed the 
creation of an independent state laboratory as a way to provide access 
to forensic services.450  The problem of improper police and/or 
prosecutorial influence on lab results weaves throughout the reported 
scandals.451  Independent crime labs are a solution, but whether they 
are politically viable seems doubtful,452 and they would present some 
disadvantages.453  A forensic commission with outside membership, 
on the other hand, could provide some insulation from impermissible 
external pressure. 
A New York statute established a Commission on Forensic 
Science,454 which is authorized to (1) develop minimum standards and 
a program of accreditation for all state laboratories, (2) establish 
minimum qualifications for laboratory directors and other personnel, 
and (3) approve forensic laboratories for the performance of specific 
                                                                                                                                      
(“[C]rime Labs should operate as a separate and independent third party force in the 
criminal justice system.  When crime labs are operating within a police department, 
examiner bias can undermine the integrity of scientific results.”). 
 450. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 4, at 52 (noting in Recommendation 20 that “[an] independent state forensic 
laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget, separate 
from any police agency or supervision.”); see also Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the 
Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
381, 422–23 (2004) (highlighting Illinois and Houston public officials’ support for an 
independent lab system). 
 451. See FUHRMAN, supra note 68, at 223 (“If [Gilchrist] were simply incompetent, her 
mistakes would have been all over the map.  Instead, her mistakes benefited the 
prosecution.”); Mills et al., supra note 153 (“Many forensic scientists at the state police 
labs, [former lab director] Plautz said, saw their role as members of the state’s attorney’s 
team.  ‘They thought they were prosecution witnesses,’ he said. ‘They didn’t understand 
they were just scientists.’ ”); Teichroeb, Crime Labs Too Beholden, supra note 23 (quoting 
co-founder of New York-based Innocence Project Barry Scheck) (“Forensic science has to 
be an independent third force in the justice system, not beholden to prosecutors and 
police.”). 
 452. The British have experimented with a “market system” provided by 
nongovernment experts:  “The [Forensic Science Service] predicts that, in the medium 
term, 20 per cent of the market will go to non-FSS sources.”  REDMAYNE, supra note 400, 
at 27. 
 453. For example: 
Increasing the laboratory’s geographical or organizational remoteness, however, 
can limit the effectiveness of the laboratory’s participation in the investigative 
phases of a case, when its scientific input may have the greatest chance of 
contributing to justice.  Remoteness also makes the police department less able to 
direct the efforts of the laboratory toward the cases that the department considers 
most important . . . . 
Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 340, at 581. 
 454. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-a (McKinney 1996). 
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forensic methodologies.455  This approach has advantages over the 
Oklahoma approach, which only requires ASCLD/LAB (a nonpublic 
organization) accreditation.456  A forensic commission could employ 
an established accreditation program, such as ASCLD/LAB, but it 
should do much more than monitor lab procedures.  These 
commissions should also ensure adequate funding, investigate 
misconduct, and compile a registry of independent experts whom the 
defense could consult. 
Before addressing these issues, however, the commission’s 
membership should be discussed. 
1.  Composition of Commission 
Representatives from the police, prosecution, judiciary, and 
forensic sciences are obvious candidates for membership.  It is critical, 
however, that research scientists457 and the defense bar also be 
represented, as is the case in New York.458  The 1992 National 
Academies report recommended the establishment of a National 
Committee on Forensic DNA Typing, commenting that 
accreditation should be a responsibility of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS), in consultation with the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).  DHHS is the appropriate 
agency, because it has extensive experience in the regulation of 
                                                          
 455. See generally Michael J. Saks et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous 
Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665, 698–703 (2001) (proposing a Commission on 
Forensic Science Services). 
 456. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West Supp. 2006–2007) (requiring 
accreditation by ASCLD/LAB or the American Board of Forensic Toxicology). 
 457. In the early 1990s, a British Royal Commission recommended the establishment 
of a Forensic Science Advisory Council that would, among other things, review the 
performance and standards of crime laboratories: 
[W]e are . . . concerned at the lack of external oversight . . . .  We therefore see 
great attraction in the proposal put to us by the Royal Society for Chemistry that a 
Forensic Science Advisory Council should be set up which would report to the 
Home Secretary on the performance, achievements and efficiency of the forensic 
science laboratories. 
ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, at 150–51.  
Unfortunately, it was not adopted.  REDMAYNE, supra note 400, at 27 (explaining that 
when the government hesitated in adopting RCCJ’s recommendations, forensic experts 
made their own, different suggestions); see also David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the 
United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 170–73 (1996) (discussing 
this proposal). 
 458. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-a (McKinney 1996); see also 1 KAUFMAN, supra note 
138, at 363 (noting in Recommendation 19 that “[a]n advisory board to the Centre of 
Forensic Sciences should be established consisting of Crown and defence counsel, police, 
judiciary, scientists and laypersons.  It should be created by statute.”). 
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clinical laboratories through programs under the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Act and has extensive expertise in 
molecular genetics through the National Institutes of Health.459 
The DNA Identification Act of 1994, however, located the 
authority to appoint DAB members in the FBI, despite the NRC 
report’s conclusion that a law enforcement agency would be 
unsuitable for this purpose.460  The Act, at least, did require the 
Director of the FBI to select members from “among nominations 
proposed by the head of the National Academy of Sciences and 
professional societies of crime laboratory officials” and to “include as 
members scientists from State, local, and private forensic laboratories, 
molecular geneticists and population geneticists not affiliated with a 
forensic laboratory, and a representative from the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology.”461  This requirement expired when the 
DAB ceased to exist after five years.462 
Congress subsequently established a National Forensic Science 
Commission to improve forensic science.463  This legislation 
                                                          
 459. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 107.  The 1996 report mentioned only an 
“appropriate organization.”  NRC II REPORT, supra note 330, at 87 (“We recognize the 
need for guidelines and standards and for accreditation by appropriate organizations.”). 
 460. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 107; see also William C. Thompson, Accepting 
Lower Standards:  The National Research Council’s Second Report on Forensic DNA 
Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 409 (1997) (“Due in part to the political clout of the FBI 
on Capitol Hill, an independent national committee was never created.  Instead, we have 
the DNA Advisory Board, which is appointed by the FBI Director.”). 
 461. 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 462. The statutory requirements governing DAB do not apply to SWGDAM, the 
group that replaced DAB at its expiration. 
 463. Its responsibilities include: 
(1) assess[ing] present and future resource needs of the forensic science 
community; 
(2) mak[ing] recommendations to the Attorney General [(“A.G.”)] for 
maximizing the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve crimes and 
protect the public; 
(3) identify[ing] potential scientific advances that may assist law enforcement in 
using forensic technologies and techniques to protect the public; 
(4) mak[ing] recommendations to the [A.G.] for programs that will increase the 
number of qualified forensic scientists available to work in public crime 
laboratories; 
(5) disseminat[ing], through the National Institute of Justice, best practices 
concerning the collection and analyses of forensic evidence to help ensure quality 
and consistency in the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve crimes 
and protect the public; 
(6) examin[ing] additional issues pertaining to forensic science as requested by the 
[A.G.]; 
(7) examin[ing] Federal, State, and local privacy protection statutes, regulations, 
and practices relating to access to, or use of, stored DNA samples or DNA 
analyses, to determine whether such protections are sufficient; 
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constitutes an important step in the right direction, but the statute 
does not specifically require the membership of outside scientists or 
members of the defense bar—persons who would bring different 
perspectives to the commission’s tasks.464  Instead, the Attorney 
General appoints members from “persons experienced in criminal 
justice issues, including persons from the forensic science and criminal 
justice communities.”465 
2.  Investigations 
A Forensic Science Commission should be assigned the task of 
investigating all cases of alleged misconduct or incompetence.  The 
lack of a government agency specifically designated with investigative 
responsibility leaves a conspicuous regulatory void.  The I.G. satisfies 
this need on the federal level,466 but the states are another matter.  In 
West Virginia, the state supreme court, at the behest of a prosecutor, 
appointed a judge to conduct an inquiry into Fred Zain’s 
misconduct.467  That judge, in turn, requested that ASCLD appoint a 
team to review the allegations.468  In contrast, the Montana Supreme 
Court ruled that it lacked authority to make this type of 
appointment.469  In Houston, the District Attorney provoked 
controversy because he refused to recuse himself from a grand jury 
                                                                                                                                      
(8) mak[ing] specific recommendations to the [A.G.], as necessary, to enhance the 
protections described in [point] (7) to ensure— 
(A) the appropriate use and dissemination of DNA information; 
(B) the accuracy, security, and confidentiality of DNA information; 
(C) the timely removal and destruction of obsolete, expunged, or inaccurate 
DNA information; and 
(D) that any other necessary measures are taken to protect privacy; and 
(9) provid[ing] a forum for the exchange and dissemination of ideas and 
information in furtherance of the objectives described in paragraphs (1) through 
(8). 
42 U.S.C.A § 14136c(b) (West 2005). 
 464. Some states have adopted a more inclusive approach.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 299C.156(1) (West Supp. 2006–2007) (requiring public defender, defense attorney, and 
university professor as members of Forensic Science Advisory Board); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (requiring defense attorney and university 
faculty or staff as members of Forensic Science Commission). 
 465. 42 U.S.C.A § 14136c(a) (West 2005). 
 466. See 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 27, at pt. I (explaining the I.G.’s role in 
investigating the explosives unit); 2004 I.G. REPORT, supra note 28, at iii (explaining the 
I.G.’s role in policing the matter of Jacqueline Blake). 
 467. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501, 502–03 (W. Va. 1993). 
 468. See id. at 504 (stating that “Judge Holliday notes that there was evidence that 
Trooper Zain’s supervisors may have ignored or concealed complaints of his misconduct” 
where such complaints were based on the team’s review of the allegations). 
 469. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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investigation when his office’s use of the suspect evidence was one of 
the issues that needed to be examined.470  Internal investigations have 
repeatedly failed to discover or report the nature and extent of lab 
failures.471 
The primary responsibility for detecting, investigating, and 
correcting instances of misconduct and gross negligence rests with the 
laboratory and its personnel.472  However, external and independent 
review is also critical and is now mandated by recent federal 
legislation.473  A forensic science commission would have the 
expertise to conduct such an investigation or to appoint an 
independent committee to do so.474 
3.  Adequate Funding 
A commission should also ensure that labs are adequately 
funded.  Crime labs have become chronically underfunded in the last 
half century.  In 1967, President Johnson’s crime commission noted 
that “the great majority of police department laboratories have only 
                                                          
 470. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutions Are a Focus In Houston DNA Inquiry:  Grand 
Juries Seen as Widening Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A20 (“In April, the 
county’s 22 criminal district court judges asked Mr. Rosenthal to recuse himself from the 
investigation.”); see also Nick Madigan, Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces 
Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A20 (reporting that operations in the 
Houston lab were suspended in December after an audit found numerous problems). 
 471. The investigations concerning the Earl Washington case, the FBI explosive unit, 
and Fred Zain are all examples. 
 472. Cf. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 148 (“Laboratories and experts have a 
particular responsibility to ensure that they are open and candid with the courts.  Any 
reservations about inadequacies or errors should be promptly revealed, and failure to do 
that should be dealt with seriously.”). 
 473. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was amended by 
requiring a “certification that a government entity exists . . . to conduct independent 
external investigations into allegations of serious negligence or misconduct substantially 
affecting the integrity of the forensic results committed by employees or contractors of any 
forensic laboratory system, medical examiner’s office, coroner’s office, law enforcement 
storage facility, or medical facility” in any state receiving a grant.  Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k(4) (West Supp. 2007)).  
Unfortunately, this requirement has not been rigorously implemented.  See OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS’ FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANT PROGRAM i (2005), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OJP/e0602/final.pdf (concluding that the 
National Institute of Justice “did not enforce the external investigation certification 
requirement imposed by the Justice for All Act of 2004”). 
 474. A few states have set up investigatory agencies.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 299C.156(2) (West Supp. 2006–2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01(4)(a) 
(Vernon Supp. 2006).  Early results, however, have not been encouraging.  See States’ 
Efforts to Probe Crime Labs Stall at Start, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), Mar. 24, 2007, at A13 
(“But not one of the new boards has yet reopened a case—either because they have 
refused to do so or because they haven’t been funded.”). 
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minimal equipment and lack highly skilled personnel able to use the 
modern equipment now being developed.”475  In 1974, President 
Nixon’s crime commission commented:  “Too many police crime 
laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the 
recruitment of qualified, professional personnel.”476 
Twenty years later, a report on Washington state crime labs 
revealed that a “staggering backlog of cases hinders investigations of 
murder, rape, arson, and other major crimes.”477  At any time, 
“thousands of pieces of evidence collected from crime scenes sit 
unanalyzed and ignored on shelves in laboratories and police stations 
across the state.”478  A USA Today survey of 215 laboratories reached 
the same conclusion:  “Evidence that could imprison the guilty or free 
the innocent is languishing on shelves and piling up in refrigerators of 
the USA’s overwhelmed and underfunded crime labs.”479  While 
budgets increased by ten percent in five years, caseloads increased by 
almost twenty-five percent.480  In one case, a suspected serial rapist 
was released because DNA analysis would have taken months to 
perform.481  “Weeks later, [the suspect] raped victim No. 4 as she slept 
in her home.  When the DNA tests finally came back—18 months 
after samples first went to the lab—a jury convicted [the suspect] of 
all four rapes.”482 
Congress recognized the need for federal funding for public 
crime laboratories and medical examiner offices by enacting the Paul 
Coverdell National Forensic Science Improvement Act in 2000.483  
Appropriations, however, have fallen well below authorized limits.484  
                                                          
 475. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967). 
 476. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1974). 
 477. Tomas Guillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence:  Crime Labs in Crisis, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 19, 1994, at A14. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1996, at 
1A. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. 
 483. Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797j–o 
(West 2003)). 
 484. See Beth Lavach, Legislative Corner, ACAD. NEWS, Sept. 2007, at  3 (“For well 
over a decade, the Congress has given off-again-on-again support to the forensic 
sciences.”).  In contrast, DNA technology has been funded.  On March 11, 2003, the 
Attorney General of the United States announced the President’s DNA initiative, entitled 
“Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology.”  This initiative proposes over $1 billion 
in funding for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 208 to reduce casework and database 
backlogs in DNA laboratories, to improve the DNA analysis capacity of public 
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The validity of forensic evidence depends on funding for facilities, 
equipment, and personnel, as well as for accreditation, certification, 
and standardization.  The Houston experience is not uncommon:  “It 
is clear that, over the 15 years preceding the DNA/Serology Section’s 
closure in December 2002, HPD and the City failed to provide the 
Crime Lab with adequate resources to meet growing demands.”485 
4.  Register of Defense Experts 
Finding qualified experts to testify for the defense is difficult.486  
The British have had some success in registering experts.487  A 
forensic science commission could be tasked with this responsibility.  
Retired FBI experts have often played a positive role in this 
context.488  Moreover, prosecution experts in one jurisdiction should 
be encouraged to consult with the defense in other jurisdictions.  
Currently, such contacts are frequently discouraged as John Wilson 
learned when he testified as a defense expert against Joyce 
Gilchrist.489 
CONCLUSION 
Scientific proof is often critical in criminal prosecutions.490  
Moreover, it is frequently better than other types of evidence 
commonly used in criminal trials (i.e., eyewitness identifications, 
                                                                                                                                      
laboratories, to support training, and to assist research and development.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY, Executive Summary 
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/dnapolicybook_exsum.htm. 
 485. THIRD HOUSTON REPORT, supra note 166, at 62. 
 486. See Weinstein, supra note 346, at 1008 (“Courts, as gatekeepers, must be aware of 
how difficult it can be for some parties—particularly indigent criminal defendants—to 
obtain an expert to testify.  The fact that one side may lack adequate resources with which 
to fully develop its case is a constant problem.”).  See generally Giannelli, The Right to 
Expert Assistance, supra note 104 (discussing the right to defense experts). 
 487. See R. Bramley, Quality in the Laboratory, 43 SCI. & JUST. 104, 106 (2003) 
(discussing the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners, which requires a 
“formal assessment by independent peer practitioners of . . . proof of competence”); see 
also REDMAYNE, supra note 400, at 218 (noting the existence of the British program to 
register experts). 
 488. Retired FBI fingerprint examiners testified in the Riky Jackson case.  See supra 
notes 314–20 and accompanying text. 
 489. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 490. See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the 
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987) (reporting the results 
of a survey which revealed that “[a]bout one quarter of the citizens who had served on 
juries which were presented with scientific evidence believed that had such evidence been 
absent, they would have changed their verdicts—from guilty to not guilty”); see also Bales, 
supra note 236, at 51 (commenting that “prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges agree 
that scientific evidence can powerfully affect—and often determine—the outcome in 
criminal cases”). 
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confessions, and informant testimony491), a point that the Supreme 
Court has made on several occasions.492  DNA profiling, for example, 
has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of scientific evidence in 
the criminal justice system—both to exonerate the innocent and 
convict the guilty. 
Paradoxically, the most scientifically sound procedure—DNA 
analysis—is the most extensively regulated, while many forensic 
techniques with questionable scientific pedigrees go completely 
unregulated.  As the 1992 National Academies report commented:  
“Because the application of DNA typing in forensic science is to be 
used in the service of justice, it is especially important for society to 
establish mechanisms for accountability and to ensure appropriate 
public scrutiny.”493  The same should apply to the entire laboratory.  
The regulation of DNA profiling, which developed gradually over the 
last twenty years, can serve as a paradigm for other laboratory units.  
The accreditation of crime laboratories, the certification of 
examiners, and the standardization and promulgation of written 
protocols for each technique would go a long way in professionalizing 
crime labs.  In addition, quality assurance programs, including 
proficiency testing and external audits, should be mandated.  Finally, 
forensic science commissions should be created in each jurisdiction to 
implement these reforms. 
                                                          
 491. See generally REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC 
INNOCENCE COMM. TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, 
ACHIEVING JUSTICE:  FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY (Paul C. 
Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (discussing misidentifications, false confessions and 
jailhouse snitches). 
 492. For example, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court observed that 
history has taught that “a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on 
the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a 
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation.”  Id. at 488–89; see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (noting 
that “fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than 
eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper 
line-up and the ‘third degree’ ”). 
 493. NRC I REPORT, supra note 330, at 162. 
